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ABSTRACT 
Security assistance and cooperation operations are a pivotal aspect of U.S. foreign and 
security policy.  The United States has a long history of assisting friendly foreign nations 
with financing, training and equipment as a means of furthering U.S. interests in the 
region.  Inherent within these operations is the role of the military advisor.  This thesis 
represents a historical analysis of advisory operations, specifically systematic case studies 
of Korea and Vietnam, and provides seven vital factors that have significant influence on 
an advisor’s ability to effectively promote increased military capabilities of his 
indigenous counterpart.  These vital factors are then be applied to contemporary advisory 
operations within Afghanistan as a means of critiquing progress thus far.  The concluding 
chapter makes policy reform recommendations for future operations based on the 
narrative developed throughout the systematic case studies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen 
said, “[the Taliban] might think they can wait us out. But within a year or so [of summer 
2010], there will be over 300,000 Afghan soldiers and police trained and ready to defend 
their country. And they can’t be waited out.”1  Secretary-General Rasmussen’s optimistic 
claim was based on the projected growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
being developed through the efforts of NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A).  
Interestingly, just three weeks later, in late June 2010, the Office of the Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGUR), established by the U.S. Congress to 
provide independent reporting and audits within Afghanistan, released a report that 
exposed significant issues with U.S. military assessments of the Afghan National Army 
(ANA).  Specifically, SIGUR found that,  
The measurements used in the assessment system overstated the 
capabilities of the ANSF, particularly for top-rated army and police units 
that did not always maintain the ability to conduct independent 
operations.2  
SIGUR’s claim was substantiated in August 2010, when 300 men from the First 
Brigade, 201st Army Corps were sent into a village called Bad Pakh in Laghman 
Province, in an attack against the Taliban, which was completely uncoordinated with U.S. 
or NATO forces.  Though touted as among the best units in the ANA, they suffered 
heavy casualties and ultimately required NATO assistance for withdrawal.3  This event, 
as well as numerous others raised questions concerning the Afghans’ ability to maintain 
security and stability once U.S. and international forces depart.  More specifically, 
                                                 
1 Anders Fogh Rasmussen. “Monthly Press Briefing,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 7, 
2010, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64083.htm. 
2 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 2010. Quarterly report to the United 
States Congress. Third Quarter. 14 
3 Rod Norland. “Showcase Afghan Army Mission Turns Into Debacle,” The New York Times. August 
12, 2010. Http://Www.Nytimes.Com/2010/08/13/World/Asia/13afghan.Html 
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incidents such as Bad Pakh call into question the ability of the United States and NTM-A 
to fully develop the ANSF into a self-sufficient and capable military.  
Within the field of Security Assistance Operations (SAO), such as those 
conducted by the United States and NTM-A in Afghanistan, military advisors play a key 
role.  In order to assess the effectiveness of SAO in Afghanistan, it is necessary to 
evaluate the performance of military advisors and the degree to which they are able to 
achieve their assigned objectives. In order to establish a baseline understanding of 
military advisors, it is necessary to examine the most significant U.S. security assistance 
operations that have taken place throughout the world since the U.S. achieved military 
superiority following World War II.  The objective of this study is to present a systematic 
case study analysis of military advisors engaged in security assistance operations.  In so 
doing, this study will identify key variables that shape the success or failure of advisory 
operations.  Once identified, these variables can then be applied to the war in 
Afghanistan.  Fundamental aspects of the advisory process transcend both borders and 
conflicts.  These aspects will provide an accurate critique of the evolution of U.S. 
military assistance, providing a way ahead for operations in Afghanistan.  
B. POLICY RELEVANCE 
The United States is scheduled to complete a roll back of combat forces deployed 
to Afghanistan by 2014.  Believing they have diminished the influence and operational 
capacity of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. government is seeking to transfer 
security sector responsibility to the Afghans.  The ANSF must achieve self-sufficiency 
for internal and external security in order for this transfer to be successful and not result 
in a return to a situation similar to the era prior to the U.S. invasion.  Given the limited 
timeframe available to the U.S. and coalition forces to develop the Afghan security 
apparatus, it is paramount that military personnel assigned advisory duties execute their 
tasks efficiently and effectively.  Failure to adapt to the realities of training military 
personnel who are ethnically fractured, permeated with corruption, and embedded with 
social systems wholly foreign to most U.S. personnel, could have catastrophic results for 
the Afghan people.  Additionally, the U.S. military has a long history of advising and 
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building foreign militaries with which to draw upon.  It is vital that best practices and 
lessons learned be applied whenever feasible in order to prevent replaying history’s 
mistakes. 
U.S. advisory efforts within Afghanistan today have benefitted from a long 
history of U.S. foreign security assistance.  Yet, U.S. personnel and their allies have room 
for increased efficiency and effectiveness.  For example, efforts to prepare advisors 
assigned in Afghanistan to overcome language barriers have improved compared to their 
predecessors assigned during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  This is not to assert that 
current language training is adequate or sufficient, but merely represents an 
improvement.  This thesis illustrates the level at which language barriers present an 
obstacle to operational effectiveness.  Additionally, training for personnel assigned 
advisory duties prior to their arrival in theater have improved compared to prior conflicts. 
Tour length and personnel turnover rates are an important factor that significantly affects 
advisors engaged in security assistance operations.  Specifically, short tour lengths that 
promote frequent turnover in personnel have historically detracted from the overall 
ability of U.S. advisors to fully complete their assigned objective.  Cultural awareness 
and efforts to prepare a military advisor for interacting in a foreign environment are 
essential to the establishment of good rapport and professionalism between military 
counterparts.  Conflicting policies that divert resources and prevent a unified chain of 
command can have drastic effects on the advisory mission.    
The above factors individually influence the ability of a military advisor to carry 
out their assigned duties within security assistance operations.  However, these variables 
are also inherently connected through the interpersonal nature of the advisor/advisee 
relationship.  Together they can compound obstacles to mission success.  For example, an 
officer with substantial language proficiency in the local dialect for the region in which 
he is assigned will likely overcome insufficient training over time.  However, the time 
period in which that officer is learning and adapting to the operational environment 
detracts from his overall effectiveness during his tour.  Thus, an officer assigned a 
relatively short one-year tour, spends a significant portion of that tour operating at a 
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diminished capacity.  Another officer, one that lacks sufficient language proficiency, 
would obviously experience even more difficulty.  
This research is aimed at yielding an unbiased critique of U.S. and allied efforts to 
build the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) during the transition from Taliban rule 
to self-sustaining democratic rule by the Afghan people.  Such a critique may be applied 
to on-going efforts in Afghanistan, as well as to other post-conflict security sector reform 
initiatives in the region.  The U.S. has taken part in advising indigenous forces in 
numerous countries and various capacities that provide ample comparison of successes 
and failures.  A comparative study of the role of U.S. advisors in major operations of the 
20th century will highlight the key variables that either facilitates increased operability 
and operational success or relative failure with direct application to the on-going effort in 
Afghanistan.  
There is a wealth of literature available regarding security assistance operations 
and specifically military advising.  However, there currently is no study that applies this 
literature specifically to the war in Afghanistan.  This study will answer numerous 
important questions such as: are we advising effectively; how do we measure 
effectiveness; are we learning from our mistakes?  While I do not believe there to be a 
silver-bullet that will miraculously enable the ANSF to become self-sufficient, I do 
believe that critical analysis can yield areas for improvement. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on systematic case studies of the role of advisors in the 
Korean and Vietnam conflicts and identifies key variables that may be applied to the war 
in Afghanistan.  By identifying these variables’ significance in their respective conflicts, 
the degree to which they apply to contemporary operations in Afghanistan can be 
evaluated.  What worked in previous operations may not be applicable to the realities of 
Afghanistan, but a path to improvement lies within evaluating the lessons of the past so 
as not to continually re-fight the last war and remake the same mistakes.    
The present advisory situation in Afghanistan will be systematically compared to 
two previous cases of U.S. advisory operations.  Korea and Vietnam provide exceptional 
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case studies for the purpose of identifying the key variables related to advisors engaged in 
U.S. security assistance.  The Korean War was the first major operation in which U.S. 
forces engaged in advisory operations after becoming the world’s preeminent military 
power following the end of World War II.  In Korea, U.S. advisors trained inexperienced, 
regular and conscript forces in conventional warfare, in order to mitigate the effects of 
North Korean aggression.  The Vietnam War was the largest and longest combat advisory 
operation (aside from Afghanistan) of the 20th century and involved training both 
experienced and inexperienced personnel in both conventional and unconventional styles 
of warfare.  Each of these case studies involves the common thread of U.S. military 
advisors.  When systematically compared, these case studies will provide a detailed 
depiction of U.S. advisory duties throughout the 20th century.  
Dr. Martin Loicano, Political Military Analyst for NATO Training Mission—
Afghanistan (NTM-A), maintains a substantial database of raw data, reports and briefings 
from numerous sources within Afghanistan, which he has made available for my 
research.  In addition to first-person accounts from those assigned advisory duties as 
available, I draw upon the multitude of data provided by the Military History Institute 
and the Center Army Lessons Learned at Leavenworth.  I limit my critique of the war in 
Afghanistan to the fall of 2003 through the present.  In the fall of 2003, the Combined 
Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) was created, and represented a doctrinal shift in 
the region to counterinsurgency requiring stronger coordination between Coalition and 
Afghan forces.4  Coalition operations prior to 2003, focused more specifically on 
eliminating Al Qaeda elements and the Taliban groups supporting them who were 
operating within Afghanistan as opposed to counterinsurgency.  This doctrinal shift 
placed significant emphasis on building the capacity of the Afghan government to 
provide for its own security and thus provides the best opportunity to evaluate security 
assistance within that capacity. 
                                                 
4 Donald P. Wright. A different kind of war: the United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), October 2001-September 2005. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army 
Combined Arms Center, 2010). 237 
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In order to evaluate the vital factors that significantly influence the effectiveness 
of military advisors within the context of each case study, I will employ a seven-point 
Likert Scale to illustrate the extent to which each factor influenced (positively or 
negatively) advisory operations.  The Likert Scale provides the ability to equally 
distribute perceptions of agreement or disagreement on subjective material.5  The vital 
factors that are discussed within this thesis are inherently subjective in nature, making 
their quantification for analysis problematic.  By utilizing the Likert Scale, it is possible 
to systematically quantify, in an ordinal manner, the frequency that each of the vital 
factors influenced advisory operations (Table 1).  The conclusion of each case study 
includes a table, utilizing the Likert Scale, to illustrate the influence of the vital factors 
based on the historical narrative developed through my research.  Chapter V provides a 
comparison of this data. 
Code Occurrence Percentage 
1 Never 0% 
2 Rarely  ~10% 
3 Occasionally ~30% 
4 Sometimes ~50% 
5 Frequently ~70% 
6 Usually ~90% 
7 Always 100% 
Table 1.   Likert Scale 
D. THESIS CONTENT 
This thesis is organized into six chapters.  Chapter I introduces the topic and 
explains its significance within the larger field of security assistance operations.  Chapter 
II provides background information on security assistance operations and the role of 
advisors.  Additionally, Chapter II contains a literature review of the most prominent 
literature regarding advisors engaged in security assistance operations, and is the basis for 
the influential variables that are highlighted within this research.  Chapter III includes the 
systematic case studies of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts involving U.S. security 
                                                 
5 Elaine Allen and Christopher Seaman. "Statistics Roundtable: Likert Scales and Data Analyses". 
Quality Progress, Vol. 40, No. 7, July 2007. 64–65. 
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assistance operations, and highlighting the key variables affecting military advisors.  
Chapter IV will critique Afghan security assistance operations based on the key variables 
and findings developed in Chapter III.  Chapter V provides a contrast and comparison of 
Afghanistan and the systematic case study.  Chapter VI contains the conclusion and 
policy recommendations based on the application of the systematic case study. 
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II. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS 
A. WHAT ARE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS? 
The term Security Assistance Operations refers to a wide field of both military 
and political actions that a state pursues in accordance with their respective security 
policy goals.  It is sometimes rather difficult to formulate a specific, yet generalizable 
definition of what does and does not fit within the realm of Security Assistance 
Operations, given the wide range of operations, policies and other actions a state might 
undertake as a matter of international policy. Joint Publication 1-02 defines security 
assistance as, 
Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 
related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, 
military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, 
or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security 
assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by 
Department of State to be administered by Department of 
Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 
The term security cooperation is defined as, 
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. 
security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-
defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with 
peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.7 
Clearly, security cooperation is a subset within the large group of programs 
termed security assistance.  This thesis is primarily focused on the role of the military 
advisor within the field of security cooperation. Military advisors are specifically affected 
or influenced by security assistance programs, such as weapons procurement programs of 
their indigenous counterparts.  Ultimately, the goal of advisors as defined above is to 
contribute to the development of the partner nation’s military forces the capacity for self-
                                                 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms. (2010). 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14106. 302. 
7 Ibid. 303. 
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defense within their borders and interoperability with U.S .and allied forces in 
multinational operations, as well as providing for U.S. access to critical forward areas 
within their borders. 
Security assistance operations, inclusive of security assistance and security 
cooperation, constitute a substantial portion of the United States’ annual federal budget.  
They have become a benchmark of the United States’ foreign policy and have 
significantly contributed to the numerous friendly relationships developed over time with 
its foreign allies.  Efficient and effective security assistance operations are heavily reliant 
on the personnel assigned within them to carry out day-to-day operations and promote 
beneficial interpersonal relationships with their foreign counterparts.  By analyzing the 
personnel assigned to these units, specifically military advisors, it is possible to identify 
the strengths and weaknesses of the system to promote increased efficiency and 
effectiveness in future security assistance endeavors. 
B. VITAL FACTORS INFLUENCING MILITARY ADVISORS 
1. Language Proficiency 
The ability of a military advisor to effectively communicate with his indigenous 
counterpart is vital to the success of his assigned mission.  Inadequate language 
proficiency leads to an over-reliance on interpreters for communication.  While 
interpreters have historically enabled military advisors to overcome the language barrier, 
the use of interpreters itself creates an environment devoid of true interpersonal 
understanding between an advisor and his indigenous counterpart.  True interpersonal 
communication, such as that between persons communicating in a shared language, 
conveys subtle, yet important information such as tone and idiom that are often omitted 
during interpretation or literal translation.  Additionally, the introduction of a third person 
presents a barrier to frank and honest communication between the advisor and his 
counterpart.   
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In cases where the interpreter is not a military professional the prevalence of highly 
technical and specialized terminology within the military vernacular further inhibits an 
interpreter’s ability to convey the message, particularly where no equivalent exists within 
the indigenous language.   
2. Cultural Training 
In addition to an advisor’s ability to communicate effectively it is vital that he 
possess a well-developed understanding of the culture and history of the environment 
within which he is assigned.  Such an understanding is only achieved through specific 
and directed study of the region that imparts on that advisor an awareness of the cultural 
norms and values that exist among the people who inhabit the region.  Failure to achieve 
this cultural understanding, presents a significant challenge to the military advisor in 
developing a professional and genial rapport with his counterpart.  While often it is the 
mission of the advisor to develop indigenous military capability to mirror or at least 
compliment U.S. military capabilities, it is vitally important to recognize that U.S. culture 
is often radically different from that of his counterpart’s culture.  Historically, the most 
effective military advisors are those who successfully employed their cultural awareness 
to adapt their communication and training methods to the local environment without 
necessarily sacrificing local norms and values. 
3. Tour Length 
The length of a military advisor’s tour of duty within the assigned region, directly 
affects his ability to achieve success in his assigned mission.  A tour of duty that is too 
short in duration inhibits the development of rapport as one advisor is constantly replaced 
with another, while the indigenous counterpart typically remains constant.  Additionally, 
as with any military rotation cycle, there exists a transitionary period in which a newly 
reported advisor is adapting to the local environment, and learning the basic 
fundamentals of his assignment.  During this transition, the advisor who is being relieved 
(if he has not already departed) is likely more focused on turnover with his relief rather 
  12 
than interaction with his indigenous counterpart.  For example, advisors who are assigned 
to a one year tour of duty will likely spend one to two months at the beginning and end of 
their tours engaged in transition rather effective advising.  
4. Advisor Selection and Training 
One of the most important factors influencing the effectiveness of a military 
advisor, is what type of officer is selected for an advisory assignment, and what type of 
training, if any, they receive prior to reporting in theater.  Historically, priority of 
assignments for the best American personnel has been to operational units, particularly 
during times of active combat operations.  The most experienced officers and senior 
enlisted personnel were assigned to U.S. units, rather than in advisory positions working 
with foreign militaries.  Specific emphasis on the quality and background of personnel 
assigned to advisory duties during the selection process was rare.  Rather, personnel were 
often assigned advisory duties on an ad hoc basis, which significantly impaired ability of 
the command responsible for security cooperation and assistance to achieve mission 
success.  Additionally, personnel selected for advisory duties received little to no specific 
training for the job they would be assigned. 
5. Governing Policy 
The security policy that governs the advisory mission significantly influences an 
advisor’s effectiveness.  Narrowly assigned objectives or the ambiguity of a desired end 
state often limit resources available to an advisor, such as budgets or equipment.  
Historically, military advisors initiate advisory operations under very limited policy 
goals, which are only gradually expanded as events unfold, such as escalation of violence 
in the region.  Insufficient emphasis placed on the importance of the advisor’s overall 
mission of developing friendly military capability within the assigned region, creates 
significant structural challenges.  Weak governing policy can create ambiguous command 
relationships between the advisory command, and parent organizations, which in turn 
negatively influences allocation of resources and operational priorities.  
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6. Indigenous Forces Training 
The primary function of security cooperation operations is the development of 
friendly military forces’ self-defense capability and capacity to take part in joint 
operations with U.S. forces.  Inherent in this process is the requirement of foreign 
military personnel to efficiently and effectively understand and adopt U.S. military 
tactics, technology and procedures.  Historically, one of the most effective methods in 
imparting U.S. military doctrine on foreign military personnel is through their attendance 
of U.S. military educational and training programs.  As the global leader in military 
technology and operations post-World War II, the United States maintains the premier 
capacity for the development of military professionals at all levels, from the most junior 
personnel to Flag and General officers.  Attendance by foreign military personnel at U.S. 
military training facilities is highly competitive given the limited quotas available to non-
U.S. personnel.  This typically results in only the most highly qualified and career 
oriented personnel from foreign militaries being sent to the U.S.  Upon their return to 
their respective parent organizations, these U.S. trained personnel are uniquely qualified 
to aid U.S. advisory personnel in the development of their organization’s military 
capabilities.  Additionally, having spent a significant amount of time living in the United 
States and interacting with English-speaking personnel both on and off duty, these 
personnel can help bridge the language barrier throughout the advisory process.  
7. Financial Dependency 
Closely associated with security cooperation operations are security assistance 
operations that provide partner nations with defense articles and training through grant, 
loan, credit or cash sales programs.  Security assistance enables partner nations to reform 
and modernize their security apparatus more rapidly and efficiently than if they had to 
rely solely on financing internal to their borders.  Additionally, these programs provide 
access to defense articles of U.S. origin to partner nations, which enables U.S. advisors to 
better train their indigenous counterparts through the utilization of equipment and 
systems, of which they already intimately familiar with.  An unfortunate consequence of 
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the security assistance program, historically, has been the development of dependency on 
foreign financial aid of the partner nation.  In many cases, the partner nation’s capacity to 
sustain a security apparatus that has received substantial security assistance within the 
confines of their defense budget is severely limited.  The results can be drastic.  
Advanced defense articles received from the U.S. often degrade rapidly as the state 
cannot afford the expensive maintenance and training requirements necessary to keep 
these articles in battle-ready conditions.  Without substantial economic reforms 
coinciding with security cooperation and security assistance, these partner nations simply 
are unable to afford the security apparatus that was created during the partnership.  This 
economic tie may be beneficial for furthering U.S. interests in the region, but may also 
entail destabilization effects, should the U.S. attempt to roll back security assistance 
programs.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A multitude of literature exists regarding numerous facets of military advisory 
duties ranging from Lawrence of Arabia’s “Twenty-Seven Articles”8 to contemporary 
policy and doctrine publications related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and 
counterinsurgency (COIN), which represent the latest evolutions of warfare.  Security 
assistance operations have become an essential element in the way the United States 
conducts its foreign and security policies.  For example, the latest Department of Defense 






                                                 
8 T.E Lawrence. “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab Bulletin, 27 August 1917, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence 
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Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in 
the coming years will be Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions: 
“hands on” efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, 
advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at 
providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and 
territories. In order to ensure that improvements in partner security forces 
are sustained, the Department must seek to enhance the capabilities and 
capacity of security institutions, such as defense ministries, that support 
fielded forces.9 
Military advisors are inherently vital to this process, and as such, their training, 
duties, and conduct should be carefully analyzed.  It is then necessary to answer the 
question, how does the U.S. military advise indigenous military forces?  Furthermore, are 
advisors, who are engaged in security assistance operations in Afghanistan, effective 
when compared to the extensive history of U.S. military assistance to foreign nations?  It 
is then important to review the available literature on the topic of military advisors in 
order to ascertain the most prominent areas of consensus and dispute. 
Key variables influencing effectiveness of military advisors are readily apparent 
within the body of literature that concerns U.S. security assistance operations.  The most 
important variable identified within the literature is rapport.  Rapport is defined as, “a 
close and harmonious relationship in which the people or groups concerned understand 
each other's feelings or ideas and communicate well.”10  Within the context of advisory 
duties, no single factor is more crucial than the development of rapport.  The 
development of rapport between an advisor and his advisee is reliant on several other 
factors, which will be mentioned below, and ultimately determine, in large part, the 
degree to which an advisor is effective in his assigned duties.   
Language proficiency, meaning an advisor’s ability to effectively communicate 
with their indigenous counterparts, is another key variable affecting advisors.  A working 
knowledge of the local dialect, particularly with regard to professional and technical 
terminology, is vital to communication between the advisor and all indigenous personnel 
they come into contact with.  Lastly, allocation of personnel to be assigned advisory 
                                                 
9 Dept. of Defense. Quadrennial defense review report. (2010). 26 
10 New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd edition. 2005. Oxford University Press, Inc. 
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duties to include: who is assigned, how they are prepared, and how long their tour of duty 
will be, greatly influences the advisory duties.  Historically, this factor has substantially 
diminished overall effectiveness of military advisors, despite the fact that it is perhaps the 
easiest to manipulate through improved pre-assignment advisor training and increased 
tour lengths. 
Any serious discussion regarding the role of military advisors should begin with 
perhaps the most famous of advisors, Lawrence of Arabia.  T. E. Lawrence wrote,  
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it 
tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions 
of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it 
is.11 
Lawrence was writing specifically about his experiences as an advisor and liaison 
during the Arab revolt against Ottoman-Turkish rule from 1916–1918.  However, his 
comments may still be applied to advisory duties in other regions despite the obviously 
significant cultural differences between Arabs and other nations.  In his review of U.S. 
military assistance to military forces in Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador, Robert D. 
Ramsey III notes,  
Not understanding the local cultural issues, the host-nations military 
institutional norms and procedures, and the specifics of local conditions, 
most advisors frequently misunderstood important things. This undercut 
rapport and increased the frustration and strain between the advisor and 
his counterpart.12 
In The U.S. Advisor, of the Indochina Monographs Series, the authors state,  
How to get along with a Vietnamese counterpart and have him receptive 
required the whole art of human relations and depended on how well the 
U.S. adviser knew the Vietnamese character and temperament.13  
                                                 
11T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles” 
12 Robert D. Ramsey. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 111 
13 Van Vien Cao. The U.S. adviser. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980).  
196 
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As a whole, the authors were rather positive on the degree to which U.S. advisors 
were able to achieve such a high level of rapport.  What makes such a claim particularly 
interesting is that the authors of The U.S. Advisor were comprised of a group of former 
Republic of Vietnam senior military officers, who were writing subsequent to the U.S. 
departure from Vietnam.  They had little reason to be overly complimentary of U.S. 
personnel, and yet they conclude, “they [U.S. advisors] invariably came away with 
profound compassion and a heart felt affection for their counterparts…”14  Clearly, the 
development of a rapport that facilitated mutual understanding and communication was 
vital to the overall success of the advisory mission in Vietnam.  Therefore, in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of advisors it is essential that every effort be made to develop 
adequate rapport between the advisor and advisee.  While there is no universal formula 
that applies equally across all cultural and political boundaries, the literature shows that 
those personnel who established rapport with their counterpart did so through determined 
professionalism, language proficiency, and experience. 
The existence of a language barrier is perhaps the most prominent obstacle 
present in the advisory process.  It can create a situation in which advisors are essentially 
deaf and blind, unable to understand what is being said around them, and unable to 
comprehend what was going on around them.15  This is particularly acute in a region 
such as Afghanistan where ethno-linguistic factionalization is prevalent throughout the 
country.  At least 40 distinct languages are spoken within Afghanistan with numerous 
local dialects that create a situation in which a tribe may speak a dialect that is mutually 
unintelligible to another tribe that resides on the other side of an adjacent mountain.  In 
Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, author 
Robert D. Ramsey III includes 14 readings all produced by people with first-hand 
experience in the field of military advising.16  Each reading places specific emphasis on 
the importance of bridging the language barrier.  Within these remarks are phrases such 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 198 
15 Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 110–111 
16 Robert D. Ramsey. Advice for advisors: suggestions and observations from Lawrence to the 
present. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 
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as, “…even a little knowledge of the language impresses and pleases…”17 or “…single 
most important factor in breaking down cultural barriers…”18 are prevalent throughout.  
This emphasis on language by former advisors demonstrates the vital importance of 
language proficiency.  During the Korean War, 
Advisors who did not know or try to learn the Korean language expressed 
greater difficulty, more frequent frustrations, and a stronger dislike for 
their advisory assignment than those who attempted to learn some 
Korean.19 
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, also places specific emphasis 
on the necessity of having language proficiency within the force as means of increasing 
combat effectiveness and operational success.20  These are simply a few examples within 
the body of available literature that uphold the value of bridging the language barrier 
during advisory operations. 
While it is true that language proficiency is exceedingly desirable given the 
aforementioned examples, it is also true that the language barrier is rarely, if ever fully 
overcome during advisory duties.  This raises the question, if language proficiency is so 
important, how have prior operations met their objectives without sufficient language 
proficiency?  Only a very small percentage of U.S. advisors in Vietnam ever reached 
even a limited level of proficiency in the local language.21  This can be attributed to the 
high level of difficulty associated with learning the highly tonal language compounded by 
the lack of military of technical terminology within the Vietnamese language.22  It 
follows that it was simply more expedient for the indigenous forces to learn English 
rather than U.S. forces attempt even rudimentary proficiency in Vietnamese.  Similarly, 
during the Korean War, “thousands of illiterate Koreans could learn English better and 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 122 
18 ibid. 124 
19 Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 16 
20 Dept. of the Army. Counterinsurgency. (2006). http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf. 
21 Van Vien Cao. 1980. 195 
22 Ibid. 
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faster than educated Americans could learn Korean.”23  It would seem that while there is 
relative agreement on the utility of language proficiency, the inherent difficulties in 
developing adequate language proficiency preclude its implementation on a force-wide 
scale.   
Prevalent throughout the body of available literature on advisory operations is the 
issue of adequate manning.  Manning applies to who gets assigned advisory duties, how 
many personnel are assigned, and how long of tour they serve.  Based on the review of 
literature, there is a general consensus that manning was often inadequate given the 
assigned objectives.  Tours in Afghanistan for personnel who are assigned advisory 
duties are typically one year to 18-month deployments, and gapped billets are routine.  As 
of June 2011, more than 1,500 personnel from 33 nations were training and advising the 
ANSF, yet this number leaves a short- fall of 490 personnel.24 
The Korean War provides examples of insufficient advisor manning.  According 
to Ramsey, often the advisors assigned at the company and field-grade level were well 
motivated, but lacked the professional acumen to properly fulfill their duties.25  He 
attributes this to the fact that in the assignment of U.S. personnel, priority was given to 
assigning the best officers to command units engaged in the combat operations of the 
war, rather than those tasked with reforming the South Korean military.26  Furthermore, 
he notes, “Getting worthless advisors relieved was easy. Poor advisors presented a greater 
problem.”27  This trend continued during the Vietnam War.  According to Ramsey, 
“Frequently, a young U.S. Army First Lieutenant, with two years of service and no 
combat experience became the advisor overseeing a commander twice his age, and who 
                                                 
23 Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 15 
24 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 2010. Quarterly report to the United 
States Congress. Second Quarter. 56 
25  Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 11 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 12 
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had 25 years of combat experience.”28  This presents a problem, as according to Michael 
J. Metrinko,  
Rank is real, whether earned or bestowed as a gift.  Rows of medals carry 
weight in foreign eyes, and until proven otherwise, ribbons, medals, and 
insignia connote gravitas, intelligence, expertise, entrée, and authority.29   
Additionally, despite specific emphasis on pacification efforts that required significant 
manpower, in 1968 Military Assistance Command—Vietnam had 2,500 fewer advisors 
than authorized under the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) 
system.30  Van Vien Cao notes, 
From the beginning to the end of the U.S. advisory effort, the RVNAF 
never requested a specific quota of advisors nor were they ever able to 
determine completely what types of advisors were required for their own 
needs.31 
Thus, a situation was created where manpower shortages, and personnel assignment 
deficiencies, on the part of U.S. forces, were exacerbated by the indigenous military’s 
inability to provide input to the process. 
Short tour lengths of personnel assigned advisory duties have routinely been a 
significant obstacle to effective advisory operations.  Specifically, personnel are routinely 
assigned advisory duties for one year tours, meaning they are not effective for four to six 
months after arriving, given the time required to acclimatize to their specific assignment. 
The process then repeats itself upon that individual’s subsequent relief.32  Meanwhile, the 
indigenous military counterparts to these advisors remain relatively constant and are 
forced to endure this cycle.  Such a situation cannot foster adequate rapport between the 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 33 
29 Michael J. Metrinko. The American military advisor dealing with senior foreign officials in the 
Islamic world. (Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, Pa. 
2008). http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS106302. 
30 Van Vien Cao. 1980. 8 
31 Ibid. 17 
32 Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 90 
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advisor and his indigenous counterpart given their short and possibly strained 
relationship. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the available body of literature, it is possible to identify key 
areas of consensus and dispute.  The available literature demonstrates a particular 
emphasis on the importance of positive rapport between the military advisor and his 
indigenous counterpart.  A strong working relationship founded on mutual trust and 
respect is vital to operational success.  Failure to develop adequate rapport has proved 
detrimental to advisory efforts and detracted from the completion of assigned objectives.  
The language barrier inherent to advising foreign military forces presents a significant 
barrier to operational success.  High levels of language proficiency can significantly 
improve advisors’ chances of success; however, history shows that often it is more 
practical for the indigenous forces to develop English proficiency rather than U.S. 
advisors developing local proficiency.  The cultural training an advisor receives prior to 
arriving in a country for duty, if any, has a significant impact on that advisors’ 
understanding of the socioeconomic nuances that permeate local society.  The 
determination of what type of personnel are assigned as advisors, with respect to 
experience level, adaptability, upward mobility, etc., affects the overall effectiveness of 
an advisory unit given the specific personnel that make up its ranks.  How U.S. forces are 
allocated to serve in advisory efforts greatly influences the achievement of their assigned 
tasks.  Short tour lengths and under-qualified personnel pose a significant obstacle.  The 
training programs, both internal and external to the partner nation, that aid in the 
development of indigenous military personnel can either greatly aid or detract from the 
advisory effort.  Finally, fiscal dependency that develops as a result of substantial 
security assistance in post-conflict and/or developing regions significantly impacts 
advisory operations with respect to the long-term self-sufficiency of indigenous military 
forces.   
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I believe these themes when applied to the Korea and Vietnam case studies, as 
well as current operations in Afghanistan, will provide an effective critique of our 
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III. SYSTEMATIC CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A review of U.S. operations within the Korean and Vietnam Wars provides 
substantial insight into the activities and responsibilities of military advisors engaged in 
security cooperation operations.  This chapter systematically reviews the historical record 
of military advisors in Korea and Vietnam, while highlighting the vital factors that 
influence an advisor’s effectiveness.  These vital factors, as previously discussed, have a 
dramatic effect on an advisor’s ability to successfully complete their assigned mission.  
The degree to which each of these vital factors resulted in a positive or negative situation 
when viewed in hindsight provides an argument for their consideration in modern 
military conflicts.  The following chapter, which critiques advisory operations in the 
modern conflict within Afghanistan, will be evaluated on the basis of the vital factors 
identified within Korea and Vietnam. 
B. KOREA 
U.S. Advisory efforts in Korea began in September 1945 following the Japanese 
surrender and rapid collapse of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA).  American units 
arrived on the peninsula in the form of occupation troops, who were rapidly deployed to 
the region in order to maintain security during the repatriation of Japanese nationals and 
subsequent reconstruction of a sovereign Korean state.  Simultaneously, military units 
from the USSR moved south from Manchuria into the Northern Peninsula to perform the 
same function in the areas north of the 38th Parallel.  This hastily made arrangement 
between the United States and the Soviets resulted in a situation where American units 
were chosen more for their expediency of deployment to the region, rather than any 
specific knowledge of the terrain or culture.  Korea presents an exceptional case study in 
the United State’s first large scale security cooperation endeavor.   
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The inherent challenges ahead for American forces that would be tasked with developing 
the capability for Korean military forces to provide for their own self-defense and 
eventual participation in allied operations were daunting. 
The task of creating a self-sufficient military apparatus in Korea was daunting 
given the relatively small contingent of Korea nationals with sufficient levels of military 
expertise.  Additionally, there was significant disdain among Koreans for anyone who 
had played a role in the Japanese colonization of the peninsula, which implicated a 
majority of the experienced Korean military community.  Specifically, initial attempts by 
United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) to retain Japanese 
officials at various levels of government by virtue of their experience in order to expedite 
stabilization and reconstruction were met with significant opposition by the Koreans.  
Considering the harsh, often barbaric, treatment of the Koreans by the Japanese during 
previous decades, it is understandable in hindsight that Koreans would not accept 
Japanese involvement in their government even on a temporary basis.33  Thus, U.S. 
officials would need to come up with an alternate course of action that could overcome 
the lack of Korean experience, while still managing to produce results within a limited 
time frame. 
U.S. Army Forces in Korea’s (USAFIK) Commanding General, Lieutenant 
General John R. Hodge assigned brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick, Provost Marshal 
General, XXIV Corps, the task of developing a Korean police agency. Under Schick, a 
study would be completed by U.S. military personnel to develop a recommendation for 
make-up of the Korean national defense forces.  Ultimately, the study recommended a 
25,000 man police force, later to be expanded and redesignated a constabulary, as well as 
Army and Air Force units totaling 45,000 men, with Navy and Coast Guard limited to 
5,000 men.34  These numbers would fluctuate in reaction to the course of events 
unfolding on the peninsula preceding the breakout of active war, causing advisors to 
continually reevaluate their methods in order to meet the requirements.   
                                                 
33 Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes. Military advisors in Korea: KMAG in peace and war. 
(Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1962).  7. 
34 Ibid. 7–10. 
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On August 15, 1948, the USAMGIK officially transferred authority to President 
Rhee and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government.  The transition from military to 
civilian control of the government necessitated a significant realignment of U.S. forces, 
which resulted in all advisory personnel being assigned to Provincial Military Advisory 
Group (PMAG) under the command of Brigadier General William L. Roberts.35  During 
the remainder of the year, PMAG would expand in size though, lacking clearly defined 
official policy regarding its advisory role, PMAG would initially struggle to make a 
significant impact in building Korean security capacity.36  In time, Roberts would further 
develop the role of PMAG and institute policies that would significantly expand the 
effectiveness of its advisors.  Chief among Roberts’s policies was the development of his 
“counterpart system.”  The counterpart system matched American military advisors with 
Korean counterparts at each level of command, battalion through division, in order to 
develop sufficient rapport between U.S. and Korean personnel such that effective training 
and increased capability could be achieved.37  This policy is notable in that it represented 
a determined effort to assign experienced advisors who could overcome challenges 
associated with an environment of differing cultures, languages and perceptions.  
Specifically, Roberts instructed his personnel that, “Advisors do not command—they 
ADVISE” and that they should not attempt to “convert the Korean into an American.”38  
U.S. advisors would face many challenges in attempting to carry out Roberts’ orders. 
On July 1, 1949, PMAG was reorganized and expanded to an authorized 500 
personnel as the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea 
(KMAG).  Like PMAG, KMAG operated under the mandate of developing the Korean 
military through advising and assistance within the limits of the Korean economy.39  
Roberts retained command despite the reorganization and name change.   
                                                 
35 Ibid. 35. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Donald J. Stoker. Military advising and assistance: from mercenaries to privatization, 1815-2007. 
(London: Routledge, 2008). 89. 
38 Office of the Chief of KMAG, Advisor’s Handbook, (17 October 1949, Mowitz Papers, USAMHI). 
2.  
39 Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces: American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 5. 
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His ultimate goal would be to ensure that all those under his command could overcome 
the numerous challenges they would face in building the Korean Military. 
A significant challenge faced by Roberts was the type of personnel, particularly 
with respect to officers, that were being assigned advisory positions within KMAG.  
Roberts received an influx of newly commissioned lieutenants without combat 
experience.40  Assignment to KMAG was not viewed as a desirable assignment, or one 
that would ensure upward mobility for future promotions.  In fact, anyone with the 
required military occupational specialty (MOS) and the need for an overseas tour could 
be selected for assignment to KMAG.41  They would be assuming an advisory role 
despite their obvious lack of specialized training, experience, or specific knowledge of 
the operational environment.  It was not uncommon for basic infantry officers to be 
assigned as the senior advisor to cavalry, mechanized or armored units, assignments for 
which they had never previously received standardized training in or had operational 
experience in any capacity.  Priority of assignments during this time went to U.S. 
operational units, meaning the best trained and most experienced personnel resided 
outside of KMAG in units with combat operations in their charter.42  Yet the young 
officers of KMAG were expected to overcome such challenges through professionalism, 
perseverance and initiative.  
KMAG advisors faced a major language barrier between themselves and their 
Korean counterparts.  Throughout the entire conflict, very few U.S. personnel ever 
developed sufficient enough fluency in Korean to effectively communicate with Korean 
personnel.  This language barrier placed a premium on English-speaking Koreans who 
could act as interpreters.  Further compounding this problem, was the significant lack of 
technical and military terminology within the Korean language to the extent that 
interpreters often struggled to communicate the true meaning of the message the 
American advisors were trying to convey.  For example, words such as “machine-gun” or 
                                                 
40 Donald J. Stoker. 2008. 94. 
41 Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. 11. 
42 Ibid. 12. 
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“phase-line” had no equivalent in Korean and had to be physically acted out to impart 
their meaning.  Spark plugs, which were clearly a vital component of the numerous 
vehicles being assigned to Korean units, were state of the art technology and were 
referred to as “bolts that spit fire.”43  The lack of printed materials in Korean slowed 
training efforts as well, necessitating rudimentary operations such as weapons cleaning 
and basic field operations to be physically demonstrated so the Koreans could learn by 
rote.44  Thus the interpreter became an indispensible companion to the U.S. advisor 
throughout the entire scope of operations on the peninsula.   
In addition to the language barrier U.S. advisors had to overcome a significant 
disparity between their own cultural norms and values and those of their Korean 
counterpart.  Cultural issues manifested themselves in various ways throughout the 
conflict and forced adaptation by both U.S. and Korean personnel if any effective training 
was to be achieved.  U.S. advisors arriving for duty in Korea, and having received no 
specific training on Korean culture were at a significant disadvantage.  Advisors quickly 
discovered that common norms within their own culture, such as military protocol, were 
not necessarily mirrored by their Korean counterparts.  Flexibility, adaptation and 
professionalism by the U.S. advisor would become vital to the success of the advisory 
mission. 
The cultural aspect of “face”, or one’s pride, self-respect or vanity, was 
particularly sensitive to advisory operations and had to be carefully taken into account 
when dealing with Korean personnel.  An advisor risked embarrassing his counterpart, 
and thus damaging rapport, should he fail to consider the perception of face in his 
conduct with his counterpart.  Additionally, advisors found their counterparts often 
reluctant to accept advice, or carry out actions that could result in a loss of face.  
Specifically, instances of Korean officers “refusing to change or modify orders, lest their 
original judgment be suspected of being wrong” were reported.45  Thus it became vital 
that for any criticism to be effective, it occur in a private discussion, rather than in a 
                                                 
43 Donald J. Stoker. 2008. 95. 
44 Ibid. 96. 
45 Donald J. Stoker. 2008. 98. 
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forum where superiors or subordinates might observe.46  These informal “hooch” 
conversations—in contrast to the formal headquarters conversations—aided the 
development of rapport by imparting knowledge without sacrificing face.47  Such an 
accommodation was particularly important in cases where an advisor’s counterpart was 
of superior rank or significantly older; which was often the case. 
Formal and informal policy issues were a constant obstacle to be overcome by 
advisors in Korea.  The KMAG mandate was to develop ROK security forces by advising 
and assisting Korean military forces and to ensure effective utilization of U.S. security 
assistance programs.  However, U.S. advisors routinely found themselves engaged in 
combat alongside their Korean counterparts.  U.S. combat commanders relied on the 
ROKA divisions to perform in combat and held the assigned advisor responsible for the 
success or failure of their units in combat despite the advisor’s lack of command 
authority.48  This created a situation where an advisor often had to take action that may 
cause embarrassment, harming his relationship with his counterpart, but perhaps be 
necessary in order to affect positive results on the battlefield.  Ultimately, a high level of 
rapport between the two would need to be developed so that through mutual 
understanding and professional respect, effective decisions could be made, particularly in 
high stress combat environments.  
By the summer of 1953, amidst growing concerns over the difficulties being 
experienced in developing ROK forces, the U.S. Army authorized the Operations 
Research Office to conduct a survey of the advisory effort.  The KMAG Advisor: Role 
and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Arm for Combat 
Operations in Korea was published in February 1957 after a draft report was circulated 
for consideration and comment.49  While this report specifically addressed many of the 
challenges faced by U.S. advisors such as language proficiency, preparatory training, and 
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tour length, very few of the recommendations included in the report were ever formally 
adopted since the war had concluded well before its publication.50  U.S. forces with the 
assistance of the ROKA had been successful in breaking the North Korean advance, 
pushing the front back to the 38th Parallel and allowing for the signing of the Armistice 
Agreement July 27, 1953.  The advisory effort would continue after major combat 
operations had ceased, but the sense of urgency for improvement of such operations 
would diminish, commensurate with the de-escalation of combat.  Simply put, the 
advisors had completed their assigned task of developing Korean military capacity, in 
that ROK forces successfully operated against enemy units, albeit with significant 
obstacles along the way.  Therefore, it was not deemed necessary to continue to devote 
significant manpower and resources to a system that already worked. 
The vital factors influencing military advisors were presented in Chapter II.  
Utilizing the Likert Scale, discussed in Chapter I, it is possible to systematically 
quantify——in an ordinal manner—the frequency that each of the vital factors influenced 
advisory operations (Table 3).  Based on the Korea case study, the below factors are 
coded in accordance with the frequency in which they influenced advisory operations.  
Recalling the previous discussion of the Likert Scale in Chapter I, the vital factors are 
coded on an ordinal frequency scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always) relative to their 
influence on advisory operations.  All vital factors identified in Chapter II were present in 
the Korea case study.  Most significant of these factors were language proficiency, 
cultural training and Advisor Selection & Training.  These factors created significant 
challenges for military advisors on a regular basis, and necessitated substantial adaptation 
to the operational environment for advisors to successfully complete their assigned 
mission.  In retrospect, it is possible to infer from this data that had these factors been 
better addressed by senior military personnel, such as more robust predeployment 
training, and more rigorous selection processes for potential advisors, advisory operations 
in Korea would have been more effective. 
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Korea 6 5 4 5 3 4 3 
Table 3.   Vital Factors Influencing Military Advisors in Korea 
1. Conclusion 
The Korean War is an exceptional case study of U.S. military advisors who were 
able to achieve their assigned task of developing military capacity of indigenous forces 
despite significant obstacles to mission success.  Not only were U.S. military advisors 
thrust into a combat environment, many of whom had fought in the Pacific or European 
theaters of World War II, but they were also charged with advising a military force that 
had never previously coordinated with Westernized military units.  The Korean language 
and culture were completely alien to all but a select few advisors assigned duties on the 
peninsula.  These advisors were not chosen for experience in advisory operations or 
knowledge of the environment in which they would be assigned.  Rather, most advisors 
were selected on the simple basis of availability for an overseas tour and MOS.  
Additionally, these advisors faced broad and often ambiguous policy objectives that 
demanded combat effectiveness of Korean forces without the benefit of unity of 
command or authority among advisory units.  Yet, the Korean War is considered largely 
a successful advisory operation due to the outcome.  Through persistence, adaptation and 
the utmost professionalism of advisors and their indigenous counterparts, sufficient 
capability for the defense of Korea was developed.  
C. VIETNAM 
The Vietnam War is the next logical case study for the evaluation of U.S. military 
advisors engaged in the development of self-sufficient military capability of indigenous 
military forces.  Given the short lapse of time between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the 
assumption that lessons learned in the previous conflict would be applied to advisory 
operations in the subsequent conflict would be logical.  However, the following case 
study will show that many of the key factors that influenced, and hindered advisory 
operations in Korea, continued to do so in Vietnam.  Cultural and language barriers 
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continued to detract from the interpersonal relationships between an advisor and his 
indigenous counterpart.  Selection and training of advisory personnel exhibited little 
improvement over the previous conflict.  Governing policy created confusion regarding 
mission priorities and created a convoluted chain of command for advisory personnel.  
Yet, U.S. military advisors were still expected to adapt and overcome these challenges to 
create an indigenous military force capable of defending the Government of Vietnam 
from northern aggression.    
U.S. military assistance in Vietnam began in earnest when an economic survey 
mission, later referred to as the Griffin mission, was dispatched by the State Department 
in February of 1950.51  The results of this survey, combined with similar research 
compiled by the Department of Defense, resulted in the approval of NSC-64 in March of 
1950 that established Indochina as a key area for U.S. foreign policy.52  This officially 
affirmed the belief that failure to support friendly regimes within the region would likely 
result in the loss of access and the eventual spread of communism, otherwise known as 
the “domino effect.”  U.S. personnel on the ground quickly became fed up with the 
conduct of the assistance program utilizing the French as intermediaries in the process.  
In the words of Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC,  
[the French] haven’t won a war since Napoleon, so why listen to a bunch 
of second raters when they are losing this war.  They are going to show 
down [sic] with me or I’ll recommend they don’t get a damn penny.53   
By September 1950, Erskine’s recommendations resulted in the establishment of 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina.  U.S. assistance was 
significantly limited in achieving its desired effect, largely due to the French maintaining 
ultimate authority and responsibility for the conduct of the war.  The French had no 
interest in U.S. support of their operations beyond equipment and financing, so U.S. 
advisors were powerless to correct the numerous inadequacies they were observing.  It 
would require the crushing defeat of French force at Dien Bien Phu, and subsequent 1954 
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Geneva accords that resulted in French withdraw from Indochina before U.S. advisors 
could effectively begin developing indigenous military capability.   
Indochina officially became the Military Advisory and Assistance Group, 
Vietnam (MAAG-V) in 1955.  However, due to the Geneva accords of 1954, MAAG-V 
was limited to only 342 personnel.54  In February 1956, the State and Defense 
departments jointly approved a plan to add an additional 350 personnel under the 
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in a separate, but subordinate group of 
MAAG-V in order to not directly violate the terms of the Geneva accords.55  TERM’s 
primary mission was to coordinate the “recovery and shipment of excess equipment” that 
remained in theater as a result of U.S. security assistance to the French, but exceeded the 
logistical capabilities of the small South Vietnamese Army.56  According to a U.S. Army 
memorandum, Army logistics personnel estimated a minimum requirement of 2,800 
personnel in various technical specialties in order to accomplish the recovery and 
logistics assistance mission.57  Such an example is indicative of the difficulties faced 
when governing policy.  In this case, the State Department’s strict adherence to the 
Geneva accords, limited resources that were required for accomplishment of the mission.  
Additionally, as numbers of U.S. personnel began to increase, the strength of French 
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Date U.S. Officers French Officers 
March 1955 68 209 
May 1955 121 225 
July 1955 124 108 
September 1955 125 66 
November 1955 142 58 
January 1956 149 53 
March 1956 189 0 
Table 4.   TRIM Strength from March 1955 to March 1956 
Policy issues detracted from advisor effectiveness throughout the Vietnam 
conflict.  These issues originated from various sources including the U.S. State 
Department, the Office of the President, as well as from the South Vietnamese 
Government.  Rivalries existed between members of MAAG-V and the State 
Department’s country team bureaucracy, making some military advisors believe the 
country team was “loaded against the military” and in particular that Ambassador 
Dunbrow mistrusted their intentions with respect to the conduct of operations within 
Vietnam.59  Additionally, MAAG-V was severely limited by the policies of the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations, which placed strict limitations on the number of advisors 
deployed to Vietnam, the size of Vietnamese forces to be developed, equipment to be 
allocated, and the “open-ended” support policy for Vietnam that lacked a clearly defined 
end-state.60  Furthermore, a 1965 study by the Army Staff entitled “A Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” identified key issues 
expressed by the over three hundred senior advisors interviewed for the study.  The report 
concluded that the advisory mission lacked “a unified chain of command” and required 
improvement in “control of direct and indirect American military support, longer tours, 
and a comprehensive debriefing and evaluation program for departing advisors.”61  This 
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conclusion was strikingly similar to the conclusions presented in The KMAG Advisor,62 
which was cited in the above Korea case study.  The advisors in Vietnam most certainly 
would have benefitted from the lessons gleaned in the Korean War being applied to 
governing doctrine rather than constantly reliving the same mistakes. 
Language training and proficiency of advisors assigned in Vietnam did not 
represent a significant improvement over their predecessors in Korea.  The language 
barrier between Americans and their indigenous counterparts continued to be a daily 
obstacle to mission completion.  Vietnamese language training was made available to 
U.S. personnel being deployed to the region as part of the Military Assistance Training 
Advisory (MATA) course of instruction at Fort Bragg.  The six-week course included 
area studies and Vietnamese language training, in addition to practical and technical 
lessons totaling 217 academic hours.63  However, the proficiency level of the average 
American advisor communicating in Vietnamese was well below average at best.  One 
Army advisor remarked, “thousands of Vietnamese learned English…but only a handful 
of the many thousands of Americans who received language training ever learned to 
really speak Vietnamese.”64  General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, 
when discussing U.S. military advisors in the Indochina Monographs could recall no 
instance “in which a U.S. advisor effectively discussed professional matters with his 
counterpart in Vietnamese.”65  One potential explanation for the lack of language 
proficiency within the Army was the lack of a single entity or governing body responsible 
for language training, or the allocation of language trained officers.  In fact, “sizable 
numbers of individuals were trained in languages without subsequently being assigned to 
jobs that called for their use.”66   Due to the inability of the U.S. military to adequately 
develop language proficiency, and allocate trained personnel to positions where they 
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would be most effective, U.S. advisors once again became heavily reliant on interpreters 
and Vietnamese military personnel who could speak English. 
American advisors received little training on Vietnamese culture and history both 
prior to arriving in Vietnam, and upon arrival.  Similar to language training, insufficient 
understanding of the indigenous culture to which an advisor would be assigned was 
identified as a significant obstacle to mission effectiveness in Korea, yet no doctrinal shift 
occurred.  U.S. advisors in Vietnam arrived just as naïve as their predecessors had several 
years before.  In a 1975 letter to the Chief of Military History, Major General Paul 
Gorman quoted one of his advisors as stating, “I would have loved to have had an 
orientation in Vietnamese history…I have no doubt that many people could have been far 
more effective had they had this background training.”67  It would have been beneficial 
for an advisor to understand the cultural undertones that permeated Vietnamese society 
and particularly the South Vietnamese officer corps.  Socioeconomic nuances such as 
family ties, religion, area of origin (such as what part of Vietnam one was from) and 
source of commission all influenced a Vietnamese officer’s conduct.68  Furthermore, 
“institutionalized corruption” was commonplace within the South Vietnamese 
government and military69, so it was necessary to understand the cultural ties that 
influenced the system, should an advisor hope to affect positive change without 
damaging rapport.  This is just one example of the numerous informal aspects of the 
Vietnamese military structure encountered by U.S. advisors.  The army’s training 
program as a whole was insufficient in preparing its advisors for the duties they would 
encounter.  As historian Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. notes, “The Army training program 
for advisors suffered problems from its inception in 1962, the result of a shortage of 
instructors, time and service motivation.”70  Krepinevich quotes one advisor who stated 
that he, “learned more about Vietnam and insurgency around the pool of the Rex Hotel in 
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Saigon then we ever learned in the states.”71  A study conducted by the Human 
Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) reported that of 605 advisors surveyed; 
only 194 had completed the MATA course at Fort Bragg, 55 had completed the Military 
Assistance Programmer Course, and just 37 had completed the Special Warfare 
Counterinsurgency course.72  This is indicative of the commonplace underutilization of 
available courses of instruction due to low level of importance placed on preparatory 
training by senior military decision-makers of the day.  Planners were more focused on 
putting boots on ground in Vietnam rather than ensuring that the personnel arriving were 
adequately prepared for their assigned duties.  
The rapid turn over of advisory personnel due to the relatively short duration of 
tour length was a constant irritation to the Vietnamese counterpart.  U.S. personnel 
initially deployed to the region for a tour length of twelve months or six months for 
operational units, however, tour length for some personnel would be extended to eighteen 
months later in the war.  The continual transition from one advisor to another obviously 
detracted from rapport, as the Vietnamese personnel remained relatively stable 
throughout.  Historian Ronald H. Spector interviewed one former advisor, who recalled,  
A Vietnamese division commander would have an adviser for eleven 
months, and then he’d get a new one.  The new one would have to start 
from the zero point again.  [The Vietnamese commander] had heard 
everything before and he knew that the adviser didn’t understand the 
language and that the adviser couldn’t be everywhere all the time to see 
what was going on…He knew all about how to handle advisers.73   
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The good performance of a tactical adviser, however, seemed to depend 
on a certain continuity and stability of effort devoted to a unit.  This would 
require him to stay at least eighteen months with a unit, but two years 
would have been better.  The one-year tour…did not maintain enough 
continuity to make the advisory effort as effective as desired…Time was 
also required for the adviser to demonstrate his abilities, obtain 
confidence, and to establish his influence within a unit.74 
Throughout the Vietnam War, there was serious discussion at the highest levels of 
the U.S. Army staff regarding the extension of tour length, but opposition to the idea of 
longer tours remained steadfast.  Many were concerned about the negative effects of 
longer tours such as declining morale and increased reliance on the draft.  Ultimately, in 
December 1965, General Westmoreland officially endorsed the twelve-month tour as a 
general rule due to morale concerns.75  It would seem that tour length, similar to 
language and cultural training, was identified as an important factor influencing the 
advisory mission with the possibility of improving overall effectiveness given the correct 
change in policy.  However, because extending tour length presented various concerns 
among the senior leadership and the advisory mission took a back seat to combat 
operations no effective change was ever made. 
As presented in the Korea case study, Table 5 illustrates the vital factors coded for 
the Vietnam case study.  Similar to Korea, all of the vital factors identified in Chapter II 
were present within the Vietnam case study.  There was little significant change in the 
influence of the vital factors when comparing the two case studies.  The most notable of 
the vital factors with respect to the Vietnam case study was the influence of governing 
policy on military advisors.  The available literature shows that this factor impacted daily 
advisory operations to a greater extent than experienced in the Korean War.  The gradual 
escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam leading to full-scale combat operations did not 
coincide with significant expansion of advisory operations infrastructure and mandate.  
Advisors were routinely forced into a combat environment alongside side their 
Vietnamese counterparts, where they had the responsibility to provide advice and 
assistance to bring their unit back alive, yet held no official authority to direct the actions 
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of Vietnamese units.  Vietnamese officers came to rely on U.S. advisors more for their 
access to U.S. fire-support and logistics, rather than for their advice.  In hindsight, had 
governing policy adequately accounted for the advisory effort, such as a unification of 
command of all advisory units under a single mandate, the overall effectiveness of 



















Vietnam 6 4 5 5 5 4 4 
Table 5.    Vital Factors Influencing Military Advisors in Vietnam 
1. Conclusion 
The Vietnam War, much like the Korean War before it, was an extremely difficult 
environment for advisors to operate within due to the several key factors that influenced 
their effectiveness.  The development of rapport between the advisor and his indigenous 
counterpart was vital to a professional relationship that could promote the increased 
military capacity of the Government of Vietnam’s security forces.  Although some formal 
training programs, such as MATA, were instituted during the Vietnam War to represent a 
relative improvement over Korea, advisors in Vietnam still received insufficient language 
and cultural training prior to arrival.  Additionally, advisor’s suffered from policy issues 
that never clearly differentiated their role in developing security capacity from that of 
those U.S. personnel who were actively engaged in combat operations.  This resulted in 
confusing responsibilities and inefficient chains of command, which prolonged the 
engagement and detracted from the quality of their efforts.  As a whole, the advisory 
mission in Vietnam represented only a slight improvement over Korea, given the 
multitude of available reports citing avenues of increased efficiency and effectiveness of 
military advisors following the Korean War. 
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IV. AFGHANISTAN CRITIQUE 
A. BACKGROUND 
Following the American military victory over the Taliban government in 2002, 
the United States, with the aid of its NATO allies and many other members of the 
international community, initiated efforts to rebuild what would become the fifth attempt 
at a centrally controlled Afghan Army since the time of Shah Durrani in 1747.  The 
prospect of creating an army that was legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people and that 
could be adequately manned, trained, equipped and deployed in defense of the Interim 
Government was daunting.  Previous centralized armies under Sher Ali Khan, Abdur 
Rahman Khan, and later Amanullah Khan, performed their duties with limited success, 
but all eventually succumbed to imperial pressure and infighting amongst power-hungry 
tribal leaders.  King Nadir Shah was successful in rebuilding a centralized force during 
the 1930s, though it faced near-collapse again from internal conflict.  Only by aligning 
with the Soviets during the occupation, did the army prevent total collapse.  Upon the 
withdrawal of Soviets, and successive rise to power of regional Mujahidin commanders, 
the Afghan army ceased to exist as a centralized force.  Even during the reign of the 
Taliban, no single centralized military force could claim responsibility for the entire 
Afghan state.  Northern Alliance factions maintained strongholds of fighters throughout 
the Northern provinces in an attempt to prevent total domination by the Taliban.  Despite 
relative security in the urban centers dominated by the Taliban, no single force had an 
uncontested claim to the whole of the sovereign Afghan state.  Thus the international 
community, lead by the United States as part of its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 
embarked on a task never achieved in the history of Afghanistan; building a self-
sufficient centrally-controlled Afghan military. 
Significant inherent obstacles to the development of a unified and legitimate 
military plagued the ruling elite throughout Afghanistan’s recent history.  Ethno-
linguistic fragmentation permeated any sizeable military force with tribal and ethnic 
bonds often superseding any sense of patriotism or nationalistic duty.  Colonialism and 
international adventurism sought spheres of influence within the ruling elite, creating a 
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system in which the sacrifice of legitimacy in eyes of some ethno-linguistic factions was 
necessary in order for rulers to achieve the economic and political power required to 
defend their regime.  In many cases, the massive geographical relocation of hostile tribes 
was necessary for the rulers of Kabul to bring relative security to the urban centers, 
leaving rural populations largely outside the influence of the Afghan government.  Such 
relocation practices resulted in a modern Afghanistan that is exceedingly fractured along 
ethno-linguistic lines with millions of Afghans having lived in refugee camps both inside 
Afghanistan and in neighboring Iran and Pakistan.  Inhabitants of these camps grew to be 
especially hostile to a centralized government that they felt lacked any sort of legitimacy 
due to the absence of ethnic representation and prevalent factionalism. 
Since 2002, volumes have been published regarding the creation of modern 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).76  Most authors agree that the development of 
the Afghan State—to include a national military—was approached as somewhat of an 
afterthought given that the primary purpose for international intervention in the country 
was reprisal for those responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in Washington, 
D.C. and New York.  Serious discussion regarding who should assume control of the 
power vacuum that was created following the U.S. search and destroy campaign against 
Al Qaeda and the Taliban factions that harbored them was not initially a primary concern 
of the U.S. government.  The Bonn Agreement signed December 5th, 2001 outlined the 
structure of the Interim Government with future milestones aimed at the development of 
permanent government institutions and legitimate elections.77  Specific to creation of an 
Afghan military the Bonn Agreement stated,  
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Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces 
and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and 
control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the 
requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.78  
Following Bonn, the Afghan government made progress developing the key ministerial 
infrastructure and human capital required to create an ANSF.  However, poor recruiting 
methods, low pay and ethnic imbalances hindered initial ANSF development efforts.79   
The U.S. advisory operations began in late 2002 with a Special Forces team being 
embedded with the ANA Third Battalion, which was the first ANA battalion to be 
deployed outside of Kabul.80  Advisory operations by Special Forces units were 
scrutinized by OEF planners who questioned the dedication of such highly trained units 
to training Afghans when they could be otherwise engaged in Direct Action (DA) 
operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Ultimately, the responsibility for advisory 
operations would shift away from Special Operations forces towards conventional forces.  
Security force assistance efforts by the United States began in earnest with the opening of 
an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Kabul under the U.S. Department of State in 
2003.  The Army’s 10th Mountain Division, which arrived in the country in summer 
2003, would assume responsibility for advising Afghan security forces.  Basic training 
would occur at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) with Embedded Training 
Teams (ETTs) being assigned to each of the Afghan Kandaks (battalions) and brigades 
under the authority of Combined Joint Task Force—Phoenix.  Task Force Phoenix also 
operated Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to augment advisory efforts.  
In May 2005, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan was 
established by CFC-A to oversee the development of the Afghan National Army.  CSTC-
A was charged with developing training institutions within Afghanistan as well as 
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managing the embedded training teams and advisors attached to Afghan military units.81  
In October 2009, NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan was created and combined with 
CSTC-A to oversee all security force assistance operations within Afghanistan.  
Lieutenant General, William B. Caldwell IV, assumed command of both CSTC-A and 
NTM-A in a “dual hatted” role on November 21, 2009.  Adopting the following mission 
statement General Caldwell and his staff embarked on a daunting task,  
NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with NATO nations and partners, 
international organizations, donors and NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations); supports GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan) as it generates and sustains the ANSF (Afghan National 
Security Force), develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional 
capacity to enable accountable Afghan-led security."82  
However, General Caldwell, in “A Letter from the Commanding Officer,” admitted, 
There will continue to be leader shortfalls in the Afghan National Army, 
and some corrupt and inefficient leaders remain in the Army and Police.  
Attrition also is a constant challenge that undermines professionalization, 
delays growth, and degrades quality.83  
Such challenges have existed within the Afghan government since its inception and are 
not necessarily unique to the security forces.  Given the broad mandate to produce a 
professional, enduring and self-sustaining security force in Afghanistan, CSTC-A has 
sought to overcome these challenges in order to meet growth and quality milestones and 
to facilitate an eventual withdrawal of international forces in Afghanistan.  Inherent 
within this process, is the ability of U.S. and NATO military personnel to serve as 
advisors to their Afghan counterparts in creating a self-sufficient Afghan security force.  
B. ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Analysis of U.S. advisory operations within Afghanistan does not benefit from the 
decades of scholarly research on the topic, to the extent that the previous Korea and 
Vietnam case studies do.  The Korea and Vietnam case studies benefit from years of 
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analysis and insight from many of the prominent historians and military theorists as well 
as hindsight bias resulting from observation of the long-term effects of advisory 
operations.  Advisory operations in Afghanistan are still rather new by comparison 
making concrete statements about the long-term effects of advisory operations difficult.  
However, there is significant available literature available to allow for the analysis of 
Afghan advisory operations in the short-term.  Anecdotal accounts published by 
personnel with first-hand experience of advisory operations in Afghanistan present an 
accurate portrayal of the challenges faced by U.S. personnel charged with the 
development of the Afghan security apparatus.  Particularly useful are the publications 
released by RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, the Center for 
Strategic International Studies (CSIS) and various other U.S. government sponsored 
activities such as the U.S. Army Research Institute For the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences.  Specifically, in December 2008, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences released a technical report entitled The Human 
Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of Interpersonal, Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory 
Behaviors84 that provides substantial data containing 151 behaviors affecting advisory 
operations. The authors surveyed 565 advisors upon their return from advisory operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan between October 2007 and April 2008.  The frequency and 
importance of the 151 identified behaviors is presented within their findings.  As a whole, 
the available literature presents an accurate account of modern advisory operations.  The 
degree to which the aforementioned vital factors influence advisors in contemporary 
operations is readily apparent utilizing these resources. 
As illustrated in the Korea and Vietnam case studies, proficiency of the military 
advisor in the language spoken by his indigenous counterpart significantly influenced his 
ability to build rapport with counterpart.  It logically follows that the same would be true 
of advisors deployed to Afghanistan.  However, a review of the available literature shows 
that compared to the other vital factors language proficiency is not as significant to the 
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overall effectiveness of an advisor as one might assume given the historical model.  The 
Human Dimension of the Advisor Role concludes from the authors’ analysis that the 
single most important factor influencing military advisors was the ability to communicate 
through an interpreter, followed by the establishment of “credibility and trustworthiness” 
of an interpreter.  Intestinally, effective communication in the counterpart’s language— 
other than a few common words—was rated significantly less important (Table 6). 85  
Interpreters are substantially more readily available to advisors in Afghanistan than they 
were to advisors in Korea or Vietnam.  Increased availability of interpreters logically 
leads to greater utilization of interpreters, particularly given the limited language 
proficiency of U.S. advisors.  Thus, as Zbylut et al. conclude, “interpreter usage is 
critical; if advisors are not proficient in the host nation language, then they must use other 
means of communicating.”  Their research further suggests, as does substantial anecdotal 
evidence, that rudimentary understanding of common words, such as greetings, are 
helpful in daily interactions with indigenous counterparts leading to increased rapport.86  
It would appear that the Army has finally embraced this concept given its inclusion in the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which states, “advisors should learn enough of the 
language for simple conversation.”87 







Communicate through an 
interpreter 19.28 4.53 4.17 
Understand the capabilities of 
your interpreter 16.42 4.33 3.60 
Conduct a meeting through an 
interpreter 16.30 4.26 3.61 
Evaluate the trustworthiness of 
your interpreter 16.08 4.40 3.48 
Exchange common greetings in 
your counterpart’s language 14.94 3.60 3.54 
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Understand your interpreter’s 
cultural biases 14.64 4.06 3.35 
Understand the background of 
your interpreter 14.42 4.06 3.32 
Read the facial expressions of 
individuals from your 
counterpart’s culture 14.20 3.64 3.43 
Read the facial expressions of 
individuals from your 
counterpart’s culture 13.89 3.63 3.36 
Interpret the gestures of 
individuals from your 
counterpart’s culture 13.59 3.58 3.30 
Speak common words in your 
counterpart’s language 13.52 3.48 3.28 
Use gestures commonly found 
in the host nation’s culture 12.77 3.39 3.14 
Spend “unstructured time” with 
your interpreter 12.32 3.43 3.16 
Prepare an interpreter for a 
meeting 11.67 3.58 2.82 
Display the body language and 
posture commonly found in the 
host nation's culture 9.41 2.84 2.46 
Share personal information 
about yourself with your 
interpreter 8.93 2.94 2.52 
Speak to others in the host 
nation’s language 8.87 3.03 2.33 
Prepare one’s transition team for 
a meeting in which an 
interpreter would be used 8.21 2.90 2.09 
Display the facial expressions 
commonly used by individuals 
from 
the host nation 7.39 2.45 2.00 
Work with an unfamiliar 
interpreter 5.17 2.90 2.09 
Talk about family in your 
counterpart’s language 3.34 1.83 0.94 
Talk about economic issues in 
your counterpart’s language 2.64 1.60 0.77 
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Talk about tribal issues in your 
counterpart’s language 2.39 1.56 0.69 
Work with an interpreter from 
the local population who has not 
been vetted 2.29 1.63 0.70 
Talk about religion in your 
counterpart’s language 1.78 1.38 0.59 
Talk about sports in your 
counterpart’s language 1.72 1.21 0.59 
Read the host nation’s language 1.68 1.44 0.54 
Talk about politics in your 
counterpart’s language 1.24 1.15 0.43 
Write in the host nation’s 
language 0.73 1.07 0.26 
Importance rating scale: 5—Extremely important, 4—Very important, 3—
Moderately important, 2—Some importance, 1—Little importance, 0—None. 
Frequency ratings: 5—More than once a day, 4—Once a day, 3—Once a week, 
2—Once a month, 1—A few times, 0—Did not perform. 
Table 6.   Linguistic and Communication Behaviors Ordered by Descending F-I 
Composite Scores88 
Similar to language training, the cultural training made available to advisors in 
Afghanistan has improved by comparison to their predecessors in Korea and Vietnam.  
This is not to say that there is not substantial room for improvement in culturally 
preparing advisors for duty in Afghanistan.  Rather, institutional measures have improved 
such as the 60-day training program at Fort Riley, Kansas that includes cultural 
awareness training, which must be attended prior to arrival in a country.89  Zbylut et al. 
found that cultural tolerance was of significant importance to the advisorial relationship 
(Table 7).  Understanding this, it becomes apparent that cultural misunderstandings and 
faux pas can have a substantially negative impact on advisory operations.   
 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 58–59. 
89 Christopher Bluesteen. Combat Advising: Three Challenges We Must Overcome to Succeed in 
Afghanistan (Small Wars Journal, 2009). 
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Demonstrate tolerance toward individuals 
from another culture.  17.33 4.14 3.97 
Be tactful toward individuals from 
another culture. 17.09 4.16 3.91 
Actively listen to individuals from another 
culture. 16.17 4.05 3.76 
Behave respectfully within the constraints 
of the relevant culture.  16.02 4.14 3.66 
Build a close relationship with your 
counterpart.  15.36 4.15 3.45 
Communicate to your counterpart that you 
respect him. 14.71 4.07 3.4 
Ask about your counterpart’s family. 13.73 3.83 3.26 
Gain the trust of individuals from the 
relevant culture. 13.17 3.85 3.11 
Be supportive of a counterpart’s decisions 
and activities.  12.99 3.89 3.06 
Spend “unstructured time” with your 
counterpart. 12.16 3.71 2.91 
Express compassion toward individuals of 
a different culture.  11.28 3.46 2.83 
Employ a Rapport Plan (continuously 
plan, execute, and refine methods to 
increase the closeness of the relationship 
with your counterpart). 9.87 3.21 2.48 
Share your personal history or 
information with your counterpart.  9.03 3.08 2.36 
Importance ratings scale: 5—Extremely important, 4—Very important, 3—Moderately 
important, 2—Some importance, 1—Little importance, 0—None. Frequency ratings: 
5—More than once a day, 4—Once a day, 3—Once a week, 2—Once a month, 1—A 
few times, 0—Did not perform. 
Table 7.   Relationship Building Behaviors Arranged in Descending Order by F-I 
Composite Scores.90 
Afghanistan is distinct from Korea and Vietnam in that, rather than being a region 
inhabited by a relatively homogeneous population such as Korea or Vietnam; 
Afghanistan’s population encompasses dozens of distinct ethno-linguistic groups and 
                                                 
90 Zbylut, et al. 2009. 83. 
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sub-groups in a tribal system.  Ethnic identity plays a key role in Afghan society and 
permeates virtually every facet of daily life.91  The largest and most dominant of the 
ethnic groups in Afghanistan are the Pashtuns, whose Pashtunwali tribal ethos 
necessitates proper understanding by outsiders if meaningful interaction is to occur.  
Furthermore, ethnic Pashtuns reside on both sides of the current conflict in Afghanistan 
with personnel fighting for both the ANA as well as the Taliban, who are primarily 
Pashtun.  Pashtunwali concepts such as badal (revenge), ghayrat (honor) and nanawati 
(sanctuary) are integral to Pashtun customary law, and can drastically conflict with 
Western notions of law and order.  Further compounding this issue is the over-
representation of ethnic Tajiks within the ANA.  Ethnic Tajiks account for approximately 
27% of the total population of Afghanistan but as of April 2009 accounted for 36% of the 
“ethnically-balanced” ANA.92  Over-representation within the officer and Non-
commissioned Officer (NCO) corps is even more striking with at least one estimate 
stating, “70 percent of the battalion commanders are Tajiks.”93  Such readily observable 
over-representation fuels ethnic tension among other ethnic groups.  Additionally, ANA 
units that are disproportionally Tajik, face significant difficulty when operating in 
predominantly Pashtun areas due to the mutual unintelligibility of Dari/Tajik (spoken by 
Tajiks) and Pashto (spoken by Pashtuns). 
Initial operations in Afghanistan, post-9/11, suffered from an insufficient 
understanding of these concepts and their importance to the Pashtuns as well as other 
similar norms and values integral to the various other Afghan tribes’ (Tajik, Uzbek, 
Hazara, etc.) way of life.  A direct and focused effort by senior military planners to 
integrate Afghan cultural awareness training into predeployment operations was required 
to mitigate the cultural disparity.  Unfortunately, the years of “search and destroy” 
                                                 
91 See Antonio Giustozzi, and Noor Ullah. 2006. "Tribes" and warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 
1980-2005. London: Crisis States Research Centre. 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp7.2.pdf.  and Thomas H. Johnson. Democratic 
Nation Building in the Arc of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential Election in Afghanistan. (Ft. Belvoir: 
Defense Technical Information Center, 2006). http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA484217. 
92 Anthony H., Cordesman, Adam Mausner, and David Kasten. Winning in Afghanistan: creating 
effective Afghan security forces. (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2009.). 74. 
93 Antonio Giustozzi. “Afghanistan’s National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization,” 
Terrorism Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 9, May 2008. 
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operations, night raids, and psy-op campaigns that preceded, increased cultural 
understanding that likely polarized a substantial portion of the Afghan population against 
the “foreign invaders.”  Thus, more than ever in Afghanistan, it is vital for military 
advisors to possess sufficient cultural understanding of their counterpart, regardless of 
ethnicity, in order for the sufficient rapport to develop that leads to an effective advisory 
relationship. 
U.S. military advisor selection and training for advisory operations in Afghanistan 
had a significant impact on their overall effectiveness in building security capacity within 
their Afghan counterpart’s security apparatus.  Additionally, tour length and rotation 
schedules influenced effectiveness is a similar manner as that in Korea and Vietnam.  The 
most dramatic improvements in advisor training occurred in the aforementioned language 
and cultural indoctrination, while specialized training related to the specific duties an 
advisor would assume largely remained lacking.  In addition to language and culture the 
training received at Fort Riley, Kansas consists of only combat lifesaver (CLS) 
certification, and generalized combat skill development and sustainment.  Advisors are 
still selected primarily on the basis of MOS and overseas operational tour availability.  
Priority of assignments of advisors is placed on those possessing combat arms specialties, 
and experience due to the emphasis placed on promoting infantry-centric Afghan military 
capacity.  According to a RAND survey of Army and Marine Corps personnel, there is 
nothing within the advisor selection process that “seeks those better suited for this 
mission to be advisors.”94  By comparison, NATO improved predeployment training for 
advisors in 2009 with the establishment of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center 
(JMRC) in Hohenfelsm Germany, the Joint Force Training Center (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, 
Poland and three days of training in Kabul prior to assignment with ANA units.95  Such a 
disparity in the training pipeline for advisors caused coordination issues with U.S. 
personnel operating in ETTs, MTTs and NATO personnel in OMLTs who were jointly 
employed under the authority of NTM-A by 2009.  The creation of the ISAF Joint 
Command (IJC), which assumed responsibility for all advising, alleviated some of this 
                                                 
94 Kelly, et al. 2011. 83. 
95 Ibid. 59–60. 
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confusion, but distinct differences between U.S. and international advisory teams 
continue to frustrate Afghan personnel.  Specifically, OMLTs are often assigned for six-
month periods in contrast to ETTs that are assigned typically for one-year tours.  
Unfortunately, the current ANA Kandak work-cycle is a nine-month cycle, which 
necessitates an advisory team turn-over in the middle of that unit’s training or operation 
phase, thus significantly degrading rapport as counterparts acclimate post-turnover.  The 
reforms initiated thus far in improving advisor training are promising, but significant 
improvements must still be initiated to account for disparate deployment schedules and 
the inherent rigors of advisory operations that extend well beyond the predeployment 
preparations currently in practice for U.S advisory personnel. 
Governing policy of all the identified vital factors, plays the most significant role 
in influencing advisory operations in Afghanistan.  As the Korea and Vietnam case 
studies have shown, the far-reaching effects of U.S. security policy and strategic decision 
making have a dramatic effect on an advisor’s ability to complete his assigned mission.  
Perhaps no more significant governing policy issue negatively influenced advisors in 
Afghanistan than the gradual increase in desired ANSF force quantity without a sufficient 
increase in the availability of resources to the U.S. advisory effort.  The original goal set 
in 2002 was to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA not to exceed 70,000 
personnel.  Seventy-thousand was deemed sufficient to provide for the self-defense of 
Afghanistan following what was then considered a successful suppression of Al Qaeda 
and Taliban fighters in the region.  By February 2008, amidst a dramatic increase in 
Taliban activity and mounting pressure, the U.S., NATO and the Government of 
Afghanistan committed to an additional 10,000 personnel bring the total to 80,000.96  By 
August 2008 instability, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces, prompted 
Secretary Gates to announce an agreement that would bring the size of the ANA to 
134,000 personnel.97   
                                                 
96 U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Afghanistan security further congressional action may be needed 
to ensure completion of a detailed plan to develop and sustain capable Afghan National Security Forces: 
report to congressional committees. (Washington, D.C., 2008) http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS96561. 
6. 
97 Louise Radnofsky. “Gates Supports Doubling Size of Afghan Force,” Wall Street Journal, August 
9, 2008. 
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Throughout this period, manning and resources available to advisory operations 
only slightly increased in contrast to the massive demands for increased output for trained 
Afghan military personnel.  U.S. ETTs suffered from an extreme under manning issue, 
placing several ANA units with either half-staffed ETTs or no ETT at all depending on 
their position in their training cycle (Figure 1).  ISAF OMLTs suffered similar under 
manning issues (Figure 2).  Additionally, as the ANSF force ballooned in size, no 
substantial change occurred regarding their training or operational employment.  U.S. 
advisors were faced with a situation that necessitated turning out trained personnel as 
rapidly as possible despite being hugely undermanned, with those units that were created 
with almost zero capacity for logistics or other support operations.  The result became an 
ANA encompassed of thousands of riflemen who could perhaps successfully engage the 
enemy on the battlefield, but were completely reliant on their U.S. advisors for such basic 
necessities and food and water resupply.  
 
Figure 1.   U.S. ETT Personnel Required and Assigned, 2007–2013(From:98) 
                                                 
98 Kelly, et al. 2011. 43. Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan, p. 38. Note: Data after November 2008 are ISAF projections. 
  52 
 
Figure 2.   ISAF OMLTs Required and Assigned, 2007–2013(From:99) 
Fiscal dependency of the Government of Afghanistan on foreign aid, primarily 
that of the U.S., to support their rapidly growing and modernizing security apparatus, 
presented military advisors with some inherent challenges. According to the GAO, NTM-
A/CSTC-A estimates the cost to fund 171,600 personnel (most current ANA personnel 
requirement as of this research) from fiscal year 2012 on, to be approximately $4.2 to 
$4.5 billion annually.  However, this estimate has not been officially promulgated by the 
U.S. Department of Defense.100  Though international aid to Afghanistan is likely even 
post-transition, the Afghan government will eventually be required to assume 
responsibility for funding its security apparatus.  Currently, the Afghan government only 
contributes a small portion of funding relative to its total expenditures (Figure 3).  
Additionally, the International Monetary Fund estimates that the Afghan government will 
not be able to cover its operating costs through the development of sufficient revenue 
                                                 
99 Kelly, et al. 2011. 44. Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan, p. 39. Note: Data after November 2008 are ISAF projections. 
100 U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional 
Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. (GAO-11-66, Jan 27, 2011). 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1166.pdf. 30. 
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until at least 2023.101  Without significant future funding from the international 
community, guaranteed for at least the next ten to fifteen years, the Afghan government 
will simply not be able to maintain its security apparatus as NTM-A and the international 
community have designed it.  Further compounding this issue are instances of failed 
delivery of financial pledges by international governments and institutions.  Specifically, 
in 2009 the international community pledged a total of $5,814,620 to Afghan 
development aid, however, by November 2009 only $1,784,020, or 30 percent, had been 
disbursed.102  Every state or institution that pledged funds failed to disburse in full with 
the exception of Luxembourg, the Russian Federation, Spain and Estonia (who actually 
dispersed more funds than pledged).103  Financial instability can potentially have the 
most dramatic affect of the ANSF of the all challenges previously discussed.  Once 
security personnel fail to receive their paycheck as promised and funding for training and 
equipment dries up most Afghans previously employed by the ANSF will simply return 
to their homes to look for alternate means of providing for their families. 
 
                                                 
101 International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Sixth Review Under the 
Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a 
Performance Criterion, Modification and Performance Criteria, and Rephasing and Extension of the 
Arrangement, Country Report No. 10/22 (Washington, D.C.: January 2010). 
102 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (GIRoA MoF), Donor 
Financial Review, Report 1388, November 2009, 
http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor'sFinancialReview%20ReportNov2009.pdf. 46. 
103 Ibid. Note: Cited report notes incomplete data submission from 19 of the 47 countries listed.  
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Figure 3.   Afghan Revenues and Total Expenditures, 2008–2013(From:104) 
A review of the body of literature pertaining to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan 
and specifically, military advisors engaged in security cooperation operations reveals 
several parallels with similar operations in Korea and Vietnam.  As with the Korea and 
Vietnam case studies, all of the vital factors identified in Chapter II were present in 
Afghanistan.  Table 8 illustrates the degree to which each of the factors influenced 
advisors in Afghanistan.  The most significant factors relative to Korea and Vietnam were 
Language Proficiency, Governing Policy and Fiscal Dependency.  The overall influence 
of Language Proficiency diminished mostly due to the increased availability of effective 
interpreters.  The influence of Governing Policy and Fiscal Dependency significantly 
increased in comparison to the other two cases.  U.S. foreign and security policy as 
described above significantly contributed to this increase. 
   
 
                                                 
104 GAO. 2011. Afghanistan Security. 32. 


















Afghanistan 3 4 5 5 6 4 6 
Table 8.   Vital Factors Influencing Advisors in Afghanistan  
C. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the available research and data pertaining to U.S. advisory operations 
in Afghanistan demonstrates an evolution in some aspects from previous operations in 
Korea and Vietnam while other factors remain roughly constant.  The obstacle of 
language proficiency that had plagued military advisors throughout history has 
significantly been mitigated through the use of interpreters and the substantial increase of 
their availability to all advisory units.  An emphasis on the importance of cultural training 
is evident from an analysis of Afghanistan, though because the country is distinct in its 
ethno-linguistic diversity the challenge of developing mutual cultural understanding will 
likely persist for years to come.  Tour length for U.S. military advisors has largely 
remained constant at approximately twelve to eighteen months, and will likely continue 
as a matter of concern for the quality of life of U.S. military personnel and their families 
back home.  Advisor selection and training has experienced limited improvement in 
comparison to Korea and Vietnam structurally, but the results of these changes are 
apparent in the relative success of advisors in Afghanistan adapting to their environment 
and completing their assigned mission.  Training of the host nation’s indigenous forces 
has also largely remained constant through each of the three cases and is heavily 
influenced by the other vital factors.  Governing policy and fiscal dependency are the two 
vital factors where Afghanistan is significantly worse off than Korea and Vietnam.  U.S. 
security and foreign policy with respect to Afghanistan create near daily challenges in the 
development of Afghan military forces.  The long-term sustainability of the ANSF is 
highly questionable given the annual requirement of multi-billion dollar financial 
assistance packages to keep the ANSF and the Government of Afghanistan operating.  
Significant reform with respect to these factors is necessary to prevent a relapse into total 
instability following U.S. and NATO military drawdowns in the region.  
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V. CASE STUDIES COMPARISON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After a thorough analysis of military advisors in all three case studies, Korea, 
Vietnam and Afghanistan, an accurate portrayal of the degree to which each of the vital 
factors influences advisory operations becomes apparent.  The body of literature related 
to the topic addresses each factor in substantial detail.  Scholarly research and anecdotal 
accounts of advisory operations portrays each of the vital factors as substantially 
influential in the overall effectiveness of advisors charged with the development of self-
sufficient security capability of the indigenous security apparatus.  The benefit of 
hindsight into the Korea and Vietnam cases provides valuable information regarding the 
long-term implications of these factors, which can then be applied to the current 
operations within Afghanistan.  Utilizing the same metric to evaluate each of the cases, 
the Likert Scale provides an accurate depiction of how each of the factors changed over 
time.  Given the subjective nature of how each of the factors was coded, it is not possible 
to logically infer trend analysis of these factors over time.  Rather, the data illustrates the 
frequency that each factor influenced advisory operations (Table 9) in each case making 
it possible to infer the relative importance of each of the factors in order to develop policy 
recommendations for the future improvement of advisory operations as a whole, which 


















Korea 6 5 4 5 3 4 3 
Vietnam 6 4 5 5 6 4 4 
Afghanistan 3 4 5 5 6 4 6 
Table 9.   Vital Factors Influencing Advisors Composite 
B. CASE STUDY COMPARISON 
Utilizing the data developed in each of the case studies and coded utilizing the 
Likert Scale, it is possible to visually depict the vital factors influencing military advisors 
in a radar chart, or spider-web chart (Figures 4, 5, and 6).  Radar charts are a means of 
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graphically representing multivariate data in a two-dimensional form with quantitative 
variables placed on the axes originating from the same point.  Utilization of a radar chart 
makes identification of differences and similarities more readily apparent in comparison 
to depiction in simple table form.  Utilizing the Likert Scale, as described in Chapter I, 
when analyzing the data shown in Figure 4, it is immediately apparent that all vital 
factors were present in each of the case studies.  Had a factor not been present, the 
resulting line would cross the central point of origin, which is not the case for each of the 
three case studies.  Additionally, because each of the vital factors contributed significant 
influence relative to each case study the resulting polygon is rather large.  If several of 
the factors had contributed minimal influence relative to the case, the resulting polygon 
would be rather small. 
 
Figure 4.   Vital Factors in Korea Radar Distribution 
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Figure 5.   Vital Factors in Vietnam Radar Distribution 
 
 
Figure 6.   Vital Factors in Afghanistan Radar Distribution 
C. CONCLUSION 
All of the vital factors influencing military advisors as presented in this thesis are 
well represented in Figures 4–6, demonstrating their inclusive importance relative to 
advisory operations.  By overlaying all three radar charts into a single composite chart, it 
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is possible to make a quick comparison of how each of the case studies compares relative 
to the vital factors (Figure 7).  The only vital factor that remained constant in each of the 
three case studies was Indigenous Forces Training, meaning this factor influenced 
advisory operations “sometimes” or about 50% of the time in each case.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that while this factor sometimes influences advisors it has largely been 
approached in much the same over the past several decades.  Other factors have 
substantially more influence and thus have evolved over time out of necessity.  
Additionally, Indigenous Forces Training is somewhat of a unique factor in that, 
individual differences between personnel receiving U.S. specialized training, such as 
advanced infantry tactics at Fort Benning, Georgia, provides the same benefits whether 
he be Korean, Vietnamese or Afghan.  Tour length also remained relatively constant 
across the case studies due to the persistence of the 12–18 month standard deployed 
ingrained in U.S. military doctrine.  Anecdotal evidence shows that military leaders have 
put considerable thought into extending operational deployments of military advisors, but 
have always determined the potential cost to morale and quality of life of advisory 
personnel to outweigh the potential benefits of longer tours. 
 
Figure 7.   Vital Factors Composite Radar Distribution 
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Most telling of the vital factors are the values identified for Fiscal Dependency 
and Governing Policy.  The influence of these factors remained high across each of the 
three case studies.  The body of literature shows the dramatic extent to which these 
factors permeate near every aspect of advisory operations and have significant long-term 
effects on the stability within the region particularly after substantial U.S. withdraw from 
the region.  The way in which the U.S. government approached the conduct of all military 
operations in each of the case studies had an immediate and dramatic impact of the ability 
of advisors to complete their mission.  The allocation of resources, continuity of critical 
mission milestones, and unity of command, all hinged on the governing policy mandated 
by the U.S. government.  The fiscal dependency that results after billions of dollars in 
security assistance are invested in the development of indigenous security capacity is 
unavoidable in instances where that nation lacks the robust economy to support a 
modernized security apparatus modeled on the U.S. military. 
The following chapter includes policy recommendations based on the above data 
to improve the overall effectiveness of military advisors engaged in the development of 
foreign military capacity.  The importance of each vital factor relative to its influence on 
advisors drives the degree to which policy reforms are necessary.  The data shows that 
each of the identified vital factors has substantial influence on advisory operations.  In an 
ideal situation financial and human capital would be unlimited and each of the vital 
factors could be sufficiently reformed to promote maximum efficiency and effectiveness 
of military advisors.  However, given the limited financial and human capital available to 
the U.S. government to seek improvement of advisory operations it becomes necessary to 
conduct cost/benefit analysis to determine which factors would result in the best outcome 
after reform takes place.   
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The achievements of advisory operations in Afghanistan, particularly since 2008, 
should not be completely overlooked.  The U.S. and ISAF have succeeded in many areas 
where their predecessors have failed.  However, there is still a long road ahead if 
Afghanistan is ever going to field a self-sufficient security apparatus capable of operating 
independent of international assistance.  ANSF development is plagued by historic 
rivalries and factionalism as well as challenges inherent to the introduction of modern 
warfare strategy and equipment.  The U.S. and ISAF have only achieved limited success 
overcoming these challenges in the past few years with precious little time left before the 
significant withdraw of U.S. and NATO forces.  
Security assistance and cooperation operations have succeeded in growing the 
force.  However, numerical growth alone is insufficient to meet the task assigned to 
advisors of developing a capable, sustained and self-sufficient security apparatus.  
Utilizing the data derived from the systematic case studies, it is possible to develop 
tailored policy recommendations for the further improvement of advisory operations.  
Only through a determined effort to continually refine and adapt advisory operations 
policy, will effective development of the ANSF result.  Failure to do so risks leaving an 
under-trained and under-manned Afghan military to stand alone against a highly-capable 
Taliban threat and ever-increasing civil unrest.  While it is likely the U.S. and NATO 
presence will endure in some form well beyond the proposed 2013 and 2014 troop 
withdraw goals, the capacity for effective security development diminishes significantly 
with each soldier that departs Afghanistan for home. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following policy recommendations are rooted in the data derived from the 
aforementioned systematic case studies of military advisors in Korea, Vietnam and 
Afghanistan.  Utilizing the Likert Scale-coded tables in the previous chapter, it is possible 
to infer the relative importance of each vital factor and thus weight policy 
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recommendations accordingly.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, in an ideal 
situation, the U.S. government would have unlimited resources with which to devote to 
reforming advisory operations.  However, since resources are finite, particularly human 
and financial capital, it is necessary to conduct a cost/benefit analysis in order to 
determine what reforms, with respect to each of the vital factors, present the maximum 
potential beneficial outcome. 
1. Language Proficiency  
Language proficiency significantly influenced advisory operations in Korea and 
Vietnam and somewhat less so in Afghanistan.  Such a development is promising, but 
further reform in this area could lead to increased effectiveness of U.S. military advisors 
through a better establishment of rapport between counterparts and increased efficiency 
of daily communication.  My initial assumption that military advisors would significantly 
benefit from high levels of local language proficiency, or that those advisors would at 
least place a high level of importance on communicating effectively in the host language 
turned out to not be valid.  As noted in Chapter IV, the increased availability of qualified 
and effective interpreters has substantially mitigated the negative effects of minimal host 
nation language proficiency among advisors.  Therefore, it would not be prudent to argue 
for a significant increase in the amount of language training given to perspective military 
advisors during their predeployment training.  In an ideal situation, every advisor would 
develop fluency in the language of the nation to which he will be assigned in order to 
communicate most effectively with his counterpart.  In practical application, this is 
simply not feasible given dynamic operational timelines and rapid turnover of advisory 
personnel.  Specifically, Dari and Pashto, the two most commonly spoken languages in 
Afghanistan, are classified as Category III languages.  Fluency training programs at the 
Defense Language Institute, Monterey, require 36 weeks of rigorous instruction for 
minimum fluency for Category III languages.105  Therefore, it is simply not possible to 
train perspective advisors to such a level of fluency within the short amount of time 
available for predeployment training.  Fluency in the host nation language should not be 
                                                 
105 Defense Language Institute, Foreign Learning Center. Program Overview – Multi-language 
School. http://www.dliflc.edu/emerginglanguage.html 
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considered a requirement for personnel assigned to advisory operations.  Chapter IV did 
identify the capability to communicate common phrases such as greetings as beneficial to 
the development of rapport between themselves and their counterpart.  For this reason, it 
is my recommendation that predeployment language training should focus on common 
phrases and greetings as well as the dynamics of communicating via an interpreter in 
order to maximize advisory effectiveness.  
2. Cultural Training 
A well-developed understanding of the culture and history of the environment 
within which an advisor is assigned is vital to his success. Specific and directed study of 
the cultural norms and values that exist among the people who inhabit the region is 
required to develop such a high level of understanding.  The narrative discussed in the 
previous chapters illustrates the severe consequences that can arise as a result of 
insufficient cultural awareness of a military advisor.  Furthermore, mutual understanding 
between counterparts leading to high levels of rapport can only develop through a 
relationship founded not just upon military professionalism, but true interpersonal 
understanding that includes mutual cultural acceptance.  It is my recommendation that 
future predeployment training for personnel assigned to advisory duties include a robust 
cultural awareness program.  Such a program must incorporate relevant topics such as 
history of the region, religion, and customs (such as Pashtunwali) that have a substantial 
influence on the conduct and perceptions of the host nation populace.  Every effort 
should be made to provide region experts such a career foreign service officers or 
academic professionals with substantial in-country experience to deliver this training to 
perspective advisors.  Cultural awareness PowerPoint presentations are wholly 
insufficient for this task.  Furthermore, advisors would significantly benefit from 
continued educational opportunities once they arrive in country that expand on their 
cultural understanding at the most localized level for the region in which they are 
assigned.  Based on the above case studies, it is not possible to develop too much cultural 
understanding.  Advisors and their counterparts significantly benefit from this factor. 
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3. Tour Length 
The case studies demonstrate that tour length of advisors assigned to advisory 
operations does significantly influence their ability to complete their assigned mission.  
Operational tours that do not coincide with host nation training and operational cycles 
can have a significant negative effect on the combat effectiveness of indigenous military 
units.  However, the anecdotal evidence discussing the possible extension of advisor tour 
length does not adequately support operational tours for advisors beyond 24-months.  The 
costs to an advisor’s morale and quality of life as a result of such prolonged periods away 
from his family outweigh the potential benefits of more time in country.  It is my 
recommendation that operational deployment of military advisors remain at the current 
duration.  However, I believe the case studies provide ample evidence to suggest that 
military planners must attempt to better align Afghan training and operational cycles with 
those advisory units assigned to them.  Transition from one advisory unit to another is 
inevitable, but the timing of that transition with respect to operational phase of the 
Afghan unit can be accounted for in long-term planning.  Transitions should occur 
between the training and operational phases of Afghan units to provide continuity of 
advisory operations during these two distinct phases. 
4. Advisor Selection and Training 
The influence of Advisor Selection and Training was evident in each of the above 
case studies.  As stated in Chapter IV, there is currently no specific guideline in the 
selection process of personnel that seeks those who may be better suited for advisory 
duties, to serve as military advisors.  There is currently no MOS for “military advisor” as 
mentioned in the Zbylut, et al. study.106  Thus, lacking a clearly defined career path, 
which builds experience through years of operational advisory duties, it is necessary to 
refine the selection process for those who will be assigned to advisory duties.  Every 
effort should be made to select personnel with previous operational tours in the region 
they are to be assigned.  Interagency and Joint-staff experience should also be a 
consideration as they impart valuable interpersonal coordination and communication 
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skills.  Personal factors such adaptability, openness to foreign cultures, and family 
situations, should all be considered in selecting the best candidates for such a demanding 
job. 
Advisor training, beyond the aforementioned language and cultural training, 
needs significant reform to better prepare advisors for the rigors of the operations they are 
to be assigned.  Tactical and technical proficiency in the area specialty of the indigenous 
units they will be assigned to (infantry, armor, intelligence, etc.) is insufficient alone to 
conduct successful advisory operations.  Prospective advisors should receive adequate 
training on the development of rapport, administrative functions, related security 
assistance programs, civil-military relations, and numerous other topics depending on the 
local region they are to be assigned to.  For example, it is not uncommon for combat arms 
units to be assigned policing duties within a post-conflict state, a task they potentially 
received little to no training in prior to arrival, especially with regard to the local laws 
and judiciary system.  Historically, senior military leaders have heavily relied on an 
advisor’s ability to adapt to their individual situation rather than adequately provide 
training prior to arrival.  Advisors will become significantly more efficient and effective 
if provided training relevant to their individual assignment prior to arrival in country.    
5. Governing Policy 
The single most influential factor identified in this thesis was Governing Policy.  
Advisors in each case study were significantly influenced by this factor with a substantial 
increase in frequency during the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars.  The advisor’s overall 
mission, the development of friendly military capability within the assigned region, has 
been hindered by significant structural challenges.  Ambiguous command relationships 
between the advisory command and parent organizations, negatively influencing 
allocation of resources and operational priorities, can result from weak governing policy.  
As noted in the Afghanistan case study, advisors suffered from a confusing dual-
command structure that required reporting procedures through both CSTC-A and Task 
Force Phoenix.  Both had authority over U.S. advisors making it often difficult to assess 
operational priorities when expectations were dissimilar between the two units.  
  68 
Additionally, non-U.S. NATO advisors reported to yet another command authority 
through ISAF, making coordination between advisory units and their Afghani 
counterparts confusing and inefficient.  The creation of ISAF Joint Command alleviated 
many of the coordination and reporting issues by placing all advisors under one 
command authority.  However, other governing policy issues continue to detract from 
advisory efforts. 
The substantial under manning of ETTs and OMLTs in Afghanistan is indicative 
of insufficient governing policy and has had a dramatic negative effect on advisory 
operations in the region.  As noted in Chapter  IV, there has existed and continues to exist 
a critical shortfall in the numbers of both U.S. and ISAF advisory personnel.  Numerous 
agencies have reported on this critical shortfall, to include the Department of Defense107, 
and yet a substantial increase in available personnel for the advisory mission is not 
forthcoming.  In order for the ANSF to begin building quality rather than simply quantity, 
it is imperative that sufficient advisory personnel are deployed to the region to fulfill the 
required billets within U.S. training teams.  My recommendation to reform this vital 
factor is simple; allocate adequate personnel to U.S. training teams based on the 
personnel required within the current planning documents rather than allocating 
approximately 50%. 
6. Indigenous Force Training 
The vital factor of Indigenous Forces Training was present in each of the case 
studies, but did not necessarily have as much influence on advisors as the other vital 
factors.  This is not to say that Indigenous Force Training is not important, rather the 
influence of this factor is simply less relative to the other vital factors identified in this 
thesis.  Indigenous personnel clearly benefitted in each of the three cases from exposure 
to U.S. run training programs, particularly those located within the United States that 
provided immersion in not just U.S. military culture, but U.S. culture in general.  Such an 
experience provided the opportunity for increased understanding between counterparts in 
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the advisory relationship.  It is my recommendation that such programs be expanded to 
provide such an experience to a larger percentage of personnel within the ANSF.  Such 
an expansion could become increasingly more important in the coming years as U.S. and 
ISAF troop levels diminish in the region making training programs internal to 
Afghanistan more limited in capacity.  Training facilities within the U.S. meanwhile will 
continue to operate at a relatively high capacity.  Additionally, continued coordination in 
this manner with ANSF personnel, particularly battalion-level commanders, will likely 
promote more effective interoperability between U.S. and Afghan into the future.  
Funding for such programs is available with existing U.S. security assistance programs.  
All that is required is a focused emphasis on the development of Afghan personnel rather 
than some of the United States’ other foreign allies. 
7. Fiscal Dependency 
After Governing Policy, Fiscal Dependency of the Afghan government on foreign 
financial assistance to manage its annual budget is the next most influential of the vital 
factors identified in this thesis.  Unfortunately, it is perhaps the most difficult to reform 
given the rather bleak outlook for the development of the Afghan economy over the next 
decade.  Many of the policies adopted by the U.S., NATO and the Afghan Government 
are irreversible with respect to the budgetary requirements of the ANSF that have been 
created to date.  Security assistance programs that provided former Warsaw Pact nations’ 
surplus equipment to the ANSF have resulted in a Afghan military logistics system that 
includes outdated and in many cases non-operational equipment after several years of 
hard-use and insufficient maintenance.  Initially, these programs provided vital 
equipment such as basic infantry weapons and vehicles quickly and at a very modest cost. 
However, over time, the expense required to keep Afghan units equipped has grown 
exponentially.  The best possible scenario to mitigate the negative influence of fiscal 
dependency in Afghanistan is increased emphasis by security cooperation and assistance 
planners in developing the Afghan military logistics infrastructure.  Such efforts must 
also coincide with international foreign policy reforms of the partner nations operating 
within Afghanistan to promote Afghan economic growth.  In post-conflict states defense 
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often accounts for a substantial portion of the government’s annual budget, making 
prolonged economic growth vital to the sustainment of an effective security apparatus. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Addressing the 2006 TRADOC/Combat Studies Institute Military History 
Symposium, Lieutenant General David Petraeus (now General, USA (ret.)) quoted 
British General Sir William Butler, who remarked in 1889, “The nation that insists on 
drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is 
liable to find its fighting done by fools, and the thinking done by cowards.”108  Thus, in 
order to avoid such a situation, it is imperative that professional military officers become 
both the fighting man and the thinking man.  An avenue to achieving this aim is 
dedicated scholarly research into our nation’s military history.  Following World War II, 
security cooperation operations became a vital component of U.S. foreign and security 
policy.  Inherent within these operations was the role of the U.S. military advisor.  This 
thesis identified seven vital factors influencing a military advisor’s effectiveness in his 
assigned mission of developing indigenous military capability among partner nations.  
Utilizing the Korean and Vietnam wars as case studies, this thesis identified the relative 
importance of each of the factors for application to the current advisory effort in 
Afghanistan.  By applying the data developed through the systematic case studies it was 
then possible to recommend policy reforms aimed at increasing the overall effectiveness 
of advisory operation in Afghanistan. 
Reforming advisory operations in Afghanistan alone will not end the violence and 
instability in the region.  For example, the growing insurgency against the U.S., NATO, 
and the Government of Afghanistan presents a significant obstacle to peace within the 
region.  Tribal rivalries and civil unrest due to questions about the legitimacy of the 
Karzai government will persist regardless of military advisory reform.  Advisory reform 
will in time help to alleviate concerns over the current policy of quantity over quality in 
the development of the ANSF.  Recent data shows that the ANSF is growing at a rapid 
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rate as they reach the desired personnel strength goals on time.  However, the ability of 
these Afghan units to actually provide for the defense of Afghanistan remains in question.  
Additionally, the current method of counting personnel toward total force strength once 
they have met the initial vetting procedures skews the data.  The total number of 
personnel trained, equipped and assigned within the ANSF is of vital importance to 
transition efforts, yet it not made clear in any of the U.S.’s and ISAF’s unclassified 
documents.  Non-standardized reporting of attrition and absenteeism further distorts the 
data.  Effective and efficient advisory operations are necessary in order to develop the 
self-sufficient capability of the ANSF to stand on its own following U.S. and ISAF 
withdrawal. 
Based on the data included in the previous chapters, a significant lack of required 
training personnel and requisite funding would plague the ANSF for the foreseeable 
future without a dedicated commitment by the international community.  The growth and 
capability requirements set forth by the U.S. and Afghan governments necessitate 
increased deployment of training personnel to Afghanistan over the next several years.  
Without qualified trainers to impart advanced skill sets to the ANSF, the Afghan 
government will lack the ability to continue counterinsurgency efforts upon the 
withdrawal of international military forces.  Afghanistan will also be financially 
dependent on the international community to fund its government and its exceedingly 
expensive security apparatus for at least the next decade, possibly much longer.  
The vital factors influencing military advisors identified in this thesis provide a 
framework for a future reform of U.S. advisory operations.  The historical narrative 
encompassed by the included Korean and Vietnam case studies illustrated the importance 
of these factors within the context of security cooperation.  Security assistance and 
cooperation operations have become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and security policy by 
promoting stability within partner states and interoperability between U.S. and friendly 
forces in times of conflict.  It is essential that such operations become more efficient and 
effective in the coming years as U.S. defense budgets face significant cutbacks despite 
the on-going instability within Afghanistan. 
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Afghanistan has been often referred to as the “Graveyard of Empires.”  Success or 
failure of the United States’ military campaign in Afghanistan will have significant 
repercussion within the international community.  U.S. failure in Afghanistan may 
indicate to its adversaries that, similar to the Soviet Union in the 1980’s, the U.S. is in a 
state of rapid decline.  Conversely, successful development of the Afghan security 
apparatus and the promotion of stability in the region signal to both the United State’s 
allies and adversaries that it is still the world’s preeminent military power.  Afghanistan 
is a case where traditional military operations are wholly insufficient to promote long-
term stability.  Only successful development of the Afghan security apparatus can lead 
the way to development and modernization of the Afghan state.  Effective military 
advisors are essential to this task.  Only by mitigating the negative effects of the vital 
factors influencing military advisors can U.S. military operations in Afghanistan achieve 
mission success.    
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